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Abstract
This thesis uses microeconometric methods to study the armed conflict in Colom-
bia.
Chapter 2 uses geographical and temporal variation in potential drug traﬃcking
networks to instrument for the prevalence of violent crime in diﬀerent regions
of Colombia. Using changes in the prices of diﬀerent international cocaine mar-
kets I identify exogenous changes in violence at municipality level. I exploit the
comparative advantage that diﬀerent regions in Colombia have when they are
serving either the cocaine market in the US or Europe. My results suggest that
homicide rates increase according to the comparative advantage each municipal-
ity has in the drug trade. However, I do not find strong evidence of the influence
of drug trade over the placement and actions of left wing guerrillas or right wing
paramilitary groups.
Thereafter, chapter 3 uses the exogenous variation from drug traﬃcking to analyse
the eﬀect of homicides on the prevalence of early motherhood. My results suggest
the one standard deviation increase in the homicide rate induces 2.65 p.p. increase
in the probability of early motherhood.
Chapter 4 proposes a microeconomic framework to describe the features of an
optimal reintegration contract. In my model, a Principal (government) collects
taxes from the community in order to fund a reintegration contract with the
Agents (illegal soldiers). This contract involves a set of threats and benefits. The
shape of such threats and benefits depends on the relative productivity of the
security technology and the level of absorption of the labour markets.
Last chapter concludes.
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Disarmament is the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons within
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and their final disposition, which may entail their destruction.
Demining may also be part of this process. From Annan (2000)
DNE Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes (National Anti-Narcotics
Bureau)
DNP Departamento Nacional de Planeación (National Planning Bur-
eau )
DRC Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo
EPL Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army). Colom-
bian former guerrilla group.
FARC Fuerza Armadas Revolocionarias de Colombia (Colombian Re-
volutionary Armed Forces). Colombain guerrila group.
IAG Illegal Armed Group
IDDRS Integrated DDR Standards
IGAC Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi.
The Colombian National Geographic Oﬃce
IS Illegal Soldier - Combatant
M-19 Movimiento 19 de Abril (19th of April Movement). Colombian
former guerrilla group.
MDRP Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
ODC Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia (Colombian Illegal Drug
Observatory)
OSAA United Nations, Oﬃce of the Special Adviser on Africa
PRSE Política Nacional de Reintegración Social y Económica para Per-
sonas y Grupos Armados Ilegales (National Policy for the So-
cial and Economics Reintegration of Illegal Armed Groups). See
COMPES 3554 - DNP (2008).
12
13
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life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or
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projects. These measures frequently depend for their eﬀective-
ness upon other, broader undertakings, such as assistance to re-
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Colombia has suﬀered a violent conflict for more than 50 years. Some authors
argue that the conflict began with “La Violencia”, a civil war between the two
most important political parties in the 1950s. Since then, guerrillas, paramilitar-
ies, drug lords and many other armed agents have changed the violent scenario
of Colombia.
For this reason, the study of the dynamics of the violent processes and their
impact on the economic institutions have called the attention of many researches.
However, the characteristics of the conflict impose many challenges especially
when attempting to quantify the eﬀects. This thesis aims to contribute to the
analysis of the cost of armed conflict using diﬀerent microeconometric methods.
Chapter 2 uses the internal potential cocaine traﬃcking to estimate exogenous
changes in violent crime rates at municipality level in Colombia. Firstly, I build
the network of internal cocaine traﬃcking linking the municipalities with potential
coca fields with the municipalities on the Colombian borders using the system of
primary and secondary roads. Secondly, I divide the network according to the
frontier where each route finishes. The division allows me to distinguish four
diﬀerent traﬃcking clusters: Pacific coast, Atlantic coast, the northern border
with Venezuela and the southern border with Venezuela.
The later division give us geographical variation on the comparative advantage
that some municipalities have on the cocaine supply to diﬀerent international
markets. For that reason, I use a reduce form approach that uses the interaction
of the wholesale price of cocaine in the American and European markets, and the
potential traﬃcking network in order to find exogenous variation on crime over
diﬀerent regions in Colombia. Identification relies on the following statement:
16
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Drug dealers react to the relative profits they could get in the international mar-
kets. Thus, an increase in the cocaine price at one market (keeping the price in
the other market constant) should increase the level of violence on the municip-
alities strategically placed to supply that market. The violence that results from
this international price variation is orthogonal to the characteristics of the local
economic agents, for instance households or firms.
The main arguments to support my identification are the following: (1) Mejia
and Rico (2010) showed that 70% of the added value of the coca market in
Colombia is due to traﬃc. (2) According to Fiorentini and Peltzman (1996),
Kugler et al. (2005) and Restrepo (2009) violence is used to enforce contracts
in illegal markets. If traﬃcking of cocaine is illegal one would expect that the
control of traﬃcking would result in violence from drug dealers seeking higher
profits. Chimeli and Soares (2010) found that violence increases in some regions
in the Brazilian Amazon when the traﬃc of Mahogany became an illegal activity.
(3) Finally, I control for the price of cocaine in the cities of Colombia to account
for possible supply shocks that may aﬀect the final price.
As expected, my results suggest that homicide rates increase in the Pacific, At-
lantic and North-Venezuelan borders when the wholesale price of cocaine in-
creases in the United States. Meanwhile, the homicide rate increases in the
South-Venezuelan border when the price of cocaine increases in Europe. After
analysing the fitness of my estimations I found a clear exogenous variation that
allow us to analyse the impact of homicides over diﬀerent municipality outcomes
in the future.
Moreover, I found evidence that guerrilla groups seek the benefits from the profits
of cocaine traﬃc. On the one hand, I found that the FARC increase its presence in
the eastern part of the country when the price of cocaine increases in Europe. On
the other hand, the ELN moves either to the Pacific and North-Venezuelan border
when the price in the United States increases, or to the South-Venezuelan border
when the price in Europe increases. Nevertheless, potential drug traﬃcking is
not as good predictor of guerrilla movements as it is of the homicide rates at
municipality level.
Chapter 3 investigates whether armed violence aﬀects the incentives of young
women regarding the timing of their first pregnancies. The hypothesis is that
violent crimes change the cost-benefit function of postponing motherhood. In
order to test this hypothesis, I initially set up a theoretical framework following
the work of Kearney and Levine (2011) in order to describe the channels in
17
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which violence could aﬀect women pregnancy decisions. Afterwards, using the
Colombian Demography and Health Survey (DHS), I estimate a discrete duration
model to quantify the eﬀect of the homicide rate on the probability of woman
to be pregnant for the first time when she is younger than 19 years old. For the
estimations I use the results of the previous chapter as a source of exogenous
variation in the municipality level homicide rate.
My results suggest that an increase of one standard deviation in the municipality
homicide rate increases by 2.65 p.p. the probability that a woman gets pregnant
before the age of 19 . Moreover, the eﬀect is stronger for women from 15 to
19. The latest result suggest that homicides aﬀect the decision of women when
they are finishing high school. They may be analysing their choices of further
education, work or starting a family. Furthermore, given the strong distribu-
tional assumptions for the duration model, I check diﬀerent functional forms for
the hazard function and the control function to prove that the results are not
driven by the initial distributional assumptions. My results hold over diﬀerent
specifications. What is more, I found evidence of non-linearity in the control
function.
Chapter 4 is marginally diﬀerent to the previous two. I develop a Principal-
Agent model to understand the shape of an optimal reintegration contract. I
pay particular attention to the influence of the informational asymmetries on the
model outcomes. Firstly, I set up a game between one principal (government)
and one agent (excombatant) following the literature on optimal welfare such
as Shavell and Weiss (1979). The Principal chooses optimally the benefit and
security scheme in order to incentivise the Agent to leave his/her illegal armed
group - IAG - and look for a job in the legal market. I show how the benefit
shape will depend on the relative productivity of the security technology and the
way that labour markets prize the job searching.
Afterwards, I extend the model introducing heterogeneity in the agents prefer-
ences for war. I assume that combatants who gain more utility from war will
be able to impose more significant damages to the community as well. What is
more, I model the role of the tax payer who will decide the size of the Principal’s
budget constraint. In this model the monotonicity assumption on the agents util-
ity and the way that security reduces the utility of criminal activities allows the
Principal to find a turning combatant. This turning combatant will be indiﬀerent
between demobilisation or staying at war. Then, any combatant with less war
preferences than the turning combatant will join the reintegration programme.
Those remaining will stay at the IAG.
18
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This later chapter aims to fill a gap in the economic analysis of the Demobilisa-
tion, Disarmament and Reintegration - DDR - programmes. These programmes
have dominated the policy agenda in countries that have suﬀered internal violent
confrontations. However, there is no technical analysis of the economic implica-
tions of these programmes.
Last chapter discuss the findings and implications of this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Internal Cocaine Traﬃcking and
Violence in Colombia
2.1 Introduction1
There is increasing interest to understand the forces and mechanisms by which
war, crime and conflict aﬀect economic institutions. However, the analysis of
internal conflicts usually deals with large heterogeneity in terms of causes, par-
ticipants, characteristics and consequences. For example, Collier and Hoeﬄer
(1998) analyse the way that diﬀerent institutions could be the cause of civil war.
What is more, Collier et al. (2001) analyses the factors that could determine
durations of the confrontations.
Besides, according to the data from Gleditsch et al. (2002)2 internal confrontation
last from less than a year to 50 years or more. Despite the majority of conflicts
finished before the first 2 years of their onset, around 20% of confrontations lasted
more than 20 years. Long-lasting conflicts could modify the internal structure of
markets, institutions and household decision process.
Apart from the diﬀerent causes and characteristics, more analytical problems
arise due to the multiple dimension of violence and conflict aﬀecting economic
agents and institutions. Soares (2013) reviews the diﬀerent welfare implications
1I want to thank Daniel Mejía and participants of the 3rd AL CAPONE meeting and the
7th ISSDP meeting for their valuable comments and feedback. Special thanks to Fabio Sanchez
from CEDE (Los Andes University, Bogotá Colombia) who provided me the violence data.
Finally I want to thank Carolina Restrepo for her exceptional help in data organisation.
2Some descriptive statistics of the durations of internal conflicts can be seen at table 2.9 in
the appendix of this chapter.
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of conflict and violence. The author categorises the possible consequences as
follows: firstly, there are direct losses as greater insecurity causes lifespan reduc-
tions and behavioural changes. Secondly, there is a social cost in the destruction
of goods, public and private investment in security, and the cost of justice and
imprisonment. Finally, crime can be the cause of productivity reductions or less
investment as a response to shorter lifespans.
Each conflict scenario implies diﬀerent challenges when researchers seek to identify
the economic eﬀects of violence. Mainly, when researchers look for exogenous vi-
olent shocks. This work aims to contribute with a new strategy to find exogenous
changes in violent crime.
In some cases, when the causes and characteristics of the violent process is clear,
it is usually possible to identify how this violence aﬀects economic agents. Some
authors used specific time/location violent shocks to identify eﬀect of conflict on
household decisions, particularly education, marriage and fertility. Among others
Jayaraman et al. (2009); Khlat et al. (1997); Schindler and Brück (2011); Valente
(2011); Shemyakina (2009); Abramitzky et al. (2010) use diﬀerent civil war events
in diﬀerent environments to identify causal eﬀects.
Nevertheless, there are not to many cases where identification of causality is clear.
It that sense, many other authors deal with more diﬃcult frameworks when they
want to find clear exogenous violent shocks in order to analyse the eﬀects on the
economy agents. This work follows the line of Dube and Vargas (2013) who asses
the eﬀect of international commodity shocks over the violence in Colombia, where
the internal conflict has been ongoing for over 60 years.
The Colombian conflict is unique not only for its duration. It combines as well
diﬀerent armed actors with diﬀerent roles in history. Firstly, left wing guerrillas
and right wing paramilitary armies have been fighting each other and fighting the
state at a local and central level. Secondly, cropping, production and traﬃcking
of cocaine created another violent force in the country since the war against big
cartels in the 80’s and beginning of the 90’s. Afterwards, the cocaine violence
turned into war amongst small criminal organisations over the profits of the illegal
drugs. Sánchez et al. (2003) present a very detailed review of how the role of
diﬀerent agents evolved during this conflict. In total, from 1964 to 2013 Colombia
registered 756197 homicides. The number of violent kills is similar to the total
population of Krakow (Poland) or Leeds (UK).
It is straight forward to claim that cocaine markets are part of the causes of the
violence in Colombia. This is clear base on the important role that the country
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plays in the international war on drugs (by 2000 the country represented 70%
of the total worldwide supply of cocaine). Most previous analyses have focused
in the relationship between production of cocaine and violence (see for example
Díaz and Sánchez (2004) and Angrist and Kugler (2008)). However, I claim that
the internal traﬃcking of cocaine, as opposed to production, is the main factor in
explaining the progression of violence in Colombia. The following reasons support
my argument.
First, Mejia and Rico (2010) showed that the proportion of the total profits
of he cocaine market that goes to traﬃckers is at least 4 times the proportion
that goes to the coca leaf farmers and producers. This means that there are more
incentives to exert violence in order to control the traﬃc than incentives to control
the fields. Secondly, Dávalos et al. (2011) showed that environmental variables,
such as weather and rain do not explain the probability of cropping cocaine in a
municipality in Colombia. According to the authors, the main factors to explain
the existence of coca fields are related with economic institutions. Finally, the
link between illegal business and crime comes from the incapacity of the diﬀerent
parts to enforce contracts without the use of violence. This idea was developed by
Fiorentini and Peltzman (1996) following the model of crime proposed by Becker
et al. (1960); Becker (1968).
Therefore, the main purpose of this chapter is to show how drug traﬃckers adjust
their decisions according to changes in the relative expected profits in interna-
tional markets. Further, their use of the road networks varies in time. Assuming
that violence is used in order to gain control over the possible traﬃc routes,
changes in the optimal use of the network would create exogenous changes in the
violent forces over diﬀerent regions over time. In order to be able to capture this
time-region variation, I construct the network that links producing municipalities
with the municipalities at the national border where the cocaine is finally sent to
international consumers.
My strategy follows closely the ideas of Dube and Vargas (2013). The interest
in internal illegal traﬃc parallels to the works of Dell (2011) and Robles et al.
(2013) who analyse drug traﬃc in Mexico. Nevertheless, one of the main novelties
of my work is that I exploit the comparative advantage that each municipality
has when serving each international market. This allows me to estimate diﬀerent
violent reactions in diﬀerent regions when diﬀerent international prices change.
This chapter is organised as follows. After this introduction, section 2.2 presents
a review of the main features of the international cocaine market and the parti-
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cipation of Colombia in this market. Section 2.3 develops the estimation strategy
describing the construction of the networks of drug traﬃcking throughout Colom-
bia. Following the estimation strategy I describe the data in section 2.4. After-
wards, I present the results of the impact of drug traﬃcking on homicides and
the actions of illegal armed groups. Finally, section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Cocaine Market
This section describes the main features of the cocaine markets around the world
with particular emphasis on Colombian’s role in cocaine markets. I describe pro-
duction, consumption, traﬃcking and the eﬀorts of the so called “war on drugs”.
This section also presents a review of the literature that explains the link between
the illegal cocaine market and violence.
The market for cocaine includes diﬀerent agents and stages; from the fields in
the producing countries, to the final consumers within the consumer countries.
During the 1980’s and early 1990’s the entire Colombian market was controlled
by a small number of powerful mafias. However, the main groups were destroyed,
the market divided into many smaller groups who compete in each stage of the
chain (Echandia (2013)).
According to diﬀerent studies from the United Nations Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime
UNODC (2011) 7 stages are identified from the Andean production to the Amer-
ican streets. Firstly, farmers sell coca leaves to local laboratories who produce
coca base. Then, cocaine is sold to local traﬃckers who aim to take the coca
base to ports. At the ports, cocaine is bought by transnational traﬃckers. These
traﬃckers ship the cocaine to traﬃckers in Mexico and sometimes in the Carib-
bean. The latter groups smuggle the cocaine across the US border, where it is
sold to wholesalers. This wholesalers sell the product to local mid-level dealers
who finally sell cocaine to street dealers in US cities.
According to UNODC statistics only 1.5% of the revenues go to Andean farmers.
98% of revenues are received by local and international traﬃckers. The European
market structure is similar, although international traﬃc is principally carried
out by groups operating in West African countries and Spain. This section will
describe each part of the market from production to consumption.
Firstly, the conditions needed to grow coca bushes are found in three South Amer-
ican countries: Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. These countries produce virtually
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all the world’s cocaine. Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the coca fields and the
potential cocaine production in each country. As we can see in panel a, Colom-
bian cropping was increasing from 1990 to 2000. This replaced the cropping in
Bolivia and Peru, keeping the total world area of fields at around 200 thousand
hectares. By 2000, Colombia accounted for 73% of the total coca crops. After
2000 the area of coca bushes in Colombia fell to around 50%, and increased in
Peru and Bolivia. Panel b shows similar cocaine production trends before 2001,
although the production does not fall as much as the cropping. This diﬀerence
could be driven by technological developments to make crops and production
more eﬃcient.
Figure 2.1: Andean Production of Coca and Cocaine by Country (1990 - 2009)
(a) Hectares of Coca Leaves Fields (b) Potential Cocaine Production
Source: World Drug Report - UNODC. Coca leave crops are estimating after eradication programmes. See UNODC (2010)
There have also been significant changes in consumption of cocaine over the same
period. According to ? consumption of cocaine was not considered a major
problem in Europe in 1997. Only 3% of the treated patients for drug abuse were
cocaine users. In contrast, in North America 40% of drug abuse was cocaine
related. Since 1998, the consumption in the EU increased while it declined in
the US. Therefore while in 1998 the diﬀerence in consumption between the two
regions was around 200 metric tons, by 2009 the quantities consumed in EU were
only 34 metric tons less than the consumption in the US.
Panel a in Figure 2.2 shows the total amount potentially consumed in Europe
and the US3. According to UNODC estimations, by 2008 the total number of
cocaine consumers in the world was around 15.9 millions with 6.2 and 4.1 in
North America and EU4 respectively. This two regions represent 65% of the world
consumers. Panel b show the estimated number of consumers in the world. While
3There are no statistics about the exact consumption of cocaine. Thus, estimations are
based on potential production, seizures and consumptions surveys.
4From the UNODC studies the European regions includes the 27 countries of the European
Union (EU) and the four countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
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the US market seems stable, and only showed a decrease after 2006, the other
markets in the world have increased since 2002. Consequently, by 2009 Europe,
the US and the rest of the world5 share equally the world cocaine market.
Figure 2.2: Consumption of Cocaine in Europe and United States
(a) Cocaine consumption (b) Cocaine consumers
Source: World Drug Report – UNODC
It is important to point out the great decline in US consumption since 2006.
From 2006 to 2007 the amount of cocaine consumed in the US fell 10%. This
trend continued until 2009. The result is a 32% decrease from 2006 to 2009. This
signifies a decrease of more than 1 million consumers in the US. As I will show
later, this decrease is accompanied by an increase price of cocaine (wholesale
and street markets). Nevertheless, the fall in consumption does not stem from
a dramatic fall in production or very strong increases in consumption in other
regions.
As we can see in figure 2.3, there is an increase in the amount of cocaine seized
from 2000 in the origin countries. What is more, from 2005 to 2007 the seizures
en route to the American market show a sharp increase. However, the amounts
seized in the final markets (US and EU), decreased after 2005.
After analysing the supply, traﬃc and demand of cocaine, I describe the evolution
of prices in consumer regions. Panel a of figure 2.4 shows the continuous fall
of wholesale prices in Europe and United States from 1990 to 1999. This fall,
according to ?, was due to the changes in the composition of the supply and traﬃc
after the disintegration of the Colombian cartels. After the new scheme in the
production and traﬃc, prices were stable in Europe. However, the United States
price continued falling until 2006. By 2006 we observe the biggest gap between
EU and US, when the diﬀerence was 17USD. However, following the drop in the
5Rest of the world adds up the consumption of Eastern Europe, Pacific countries, South
America and Africa.
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Figure 2.3: Cocaine seizures by international market
(a) From Andes to US (b) From Andes to EU
Source: World Drug Report – UNODC. Andes includes Colombia and Peru. Traﬃc to US adds Mexico, Central America and
Caribbean countries. Via to EU adds Venezuela and West Africa
US consumption rates, the price in the United States sharply increased until 2009,
when it finally reached the European price.
Figure 2.4: Wholesale price and street price mark up of cocaine in Europe and
United States
(a) Cocaine wholesale price
(b) Street price mark up –
Street Price
Wholesale Price
Source: World Drug Report – UNODC. Prices in current USD of 2009. Prices are purity corrected.
Panel b shows the mark up – mki = Street PriceiWholesale Price – inside each of the consumer
areas. The trends show diﬀerences from one another. The European market
does not have much volatility and only showed a slightly increase in the early
90’s followed by a constant but slow decrease. The American market shows a
volatile mark up, increasing from 2002 onwards. It is important to point out
the diﬀerence in levels: the American market has, on average, a mark up of 3.5
USD while the mean European mark up mean is 2.1 USD. Furthermore, in 2009,
when both wholesale prices were equal, the mark up diﬀerence is 2.4 USD (4.2
in US and 1.7 in EU). This can be an indicator of greater market power for the
transnational traﬃckers going to Europe.
In the last part of this section I describe the role and dynamics of the cocaine
26
2. Internal Cocaine Traﬃcking and Violence in Colombia 27
market in Colombia. I focus in the cropping, production and internal traﬃcking.
As I have already shown in figure 2.1, since 1997 Colombia has been the main
supplier of cocaine in the world. Figure 2.5 shows clearly the increase in Colom-
bian participation in either cropping and production that reached almost 80% of
the share in 2000. Importantly, after 1999 the share of Colombian production was
larger than the share in cropping. This suggest that improved productivity may
be a response to the increased pressure on crop eradication, which I will describe
next.
Figure 2.5: Colombian share in the cocaine production
Source: World Drug Report – UNODC. Eradication’s includes manual and aerial
The total production and cropping is not the only change over this period of time.
Following the reports from the Coca Monitoring System (SIMCI), we can observe
that cocaine fields have been moved around diﬀerent regions of Colombia. Figure
2.6 shows the prevalence of the coca crops from 2001. The map shows, in diﬀerent
colours, the number of years that a municipality has more than 20% of its area
for the use of coca cropping. Then, in dark green we find the areas with coca
fields for more than 7 years. The table attached to the map marks changes in the
cropping strategy. In 2001 Colombia had fewer municipalities with large areas
cultivated – 130 hectares on average which represented 63% of the area of each
municipality. By 2009, there were more municipalities involve but with smaller
fields – 61 hectares on average.
Even though Colombian’s main role in the cocaine market is cropping and pro-
duction, Mejia and Rico (2010) show that they represent no more than 30% of the
internal added value chain. However, internal traﬃc accounts for almost 70% of
the added value of the market of cocaine. This feature is part of my identification
strategy that will explain in more detail later in this chapter. To summarise, the
authors calculations showed that by 2008 the cocaine industry represents 2.3%
of the Colombian GDP. This number is lower than previous estimations of 4% to
5% from 1982 to 1998 – see Steiner (1998).
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Figure 2.6: Coca crops prevalence (2001 - 2009)
Years with coca crops Year Municipalities Hectares % of area
with cultivated cultivated
coca fields (average) (average)
2001 164 129.06 0.63
2002 168 90.97 0.33
2003 185 76.94 0.34
2004 190 71.61 0.36
2005 190 76.43 0.36
2006 199 69.40 0.36
2007 190 86.52 0.51
2008 206 72.15 0.45
2009 217 60.63 0.38
Source: SIMCI – UNODC. Author calculations.
Since this chapter focuses on the eﬀect of internal cocaine traﬃcking, the last
part of this section describes some features of its structure. I use the analysis of
Mejia and Rico (2010). The authors point out that diﬀerent structures depend
on the level of participation of the illegal armies – either left wing guerrillas or
paramilitary armies – who are usually the owners of the crops. In some cases
illegal armies sell directly from the laboratory transferring the traﬃc risk to the
buyer who is usually a national traﬃcker. In other cases, illegal groups share the
risk with traﬃckers. According to the authors, this has been the most common
approach used by FARC when they sell the cocaine to the American market via
the Pacific and Central America.
Another recent change in the market structure is the relationship between diﬀer-
ent illegal armed groups. Previously, paramilitary and guerrillas fought for the
control of production and traﬃc. However, currently the new criminal organ-
isations and traﬃckers enter into business with the main illegal armies without
taking into account their political orientation. What is more, in some regions
former paramilitaries and guerrillas have joined forces to control cocaine traﬃck-
ing (see Echandia (2013)).
This section described the main features of production and consumption of co-
caine and the role of Colombia in the market. However, the evolution of interna-
tional and internal traﬃcking will be described in more detail in the later sections.
Traﬃcking is indeed the key feature of the market that I am exploiting in order
to estimate exogenous variation in the violence in Colombia at the municipality
level.
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2.3 Estimation Strategy
This chapter claims that in Colombia violent crime is more prevalent along the
routes used for drug traﬃcking. Moreover, the routes used by drug traﬃckers vary
over time depending on which international market they are willing to supply. In
this section I will argue that traﬃckers behaviour provides us with exogenous
variation in the level of violence in diﬀerent areas.
This work analyses the eﬀect of internal cocaine traﬃcking instead of the eﬀect
of cropping and production on violence which is the major strategy. Previous
analysis in Colombia, for example Angrist and Kugler (2008); Díaz and Sánchez
(2004) have focused on the eﬀect of coca cropping and production on violence.
Therefore, identification relies on the following statements: Drug traﬃckers ad-
just their decisions according to changes in the relative expected profits they
could get in international markets. Thus, violence within a municipality will vary
depending on the competitive advantage it has on diﬀerent international markets.
My identification strategy follows the ideas of Dube and Vargas (2013) who used
commodity price shocks and their eﬀect on local legal and illegal economies to
assess regional variations of violence. The idea to use the illegal drug market
traﬃc is also similar to Dell (2011) and Robles et al. (2013) analysis in Mexico.
However, while Robles et al. (2013) uses cocaine supply shocks to instrument
violence in Mexico through which cocaine is traﬃcked to US, I use demand shocks
to instrument violence in Colombia. This work is significant because Colombia is
the most important producing country.
As I argued above, my analysis is supported by Mejia and Rico (2010) who showed
that 70% of the added value of the coca market in Colombia is due to traﬃc. What
is more, Dávalos et al. (2008, 2011) claim that environmental variables are not
the main driving forces of coca farming. They found that the presence of coca
is explained mainly by the low presence of the central government institutions.
Additionally, according to Fiorentini and Peltzman (1996) and Restrepo (2009)
violence is used to enforce contracts in illegal markets. If traﬃcking and produc-
tion are both illegal, one would expect that the control of traﬃcking would imply
more violence from groups that seek higher profits. Likewise, Chimeli and Soares
(2010) give evidence of the causal eﬀect of illegality over violence in the control
of the Mahogany market in the Amazon.
Given that Colombia is the main producer of cocaine, one can expect that Colom-
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bian drug dealers may be able to change the price in the international markets.
The latest claim will aﬀect identification. Nevertheless, Echandia (2013) showed
that in Colombia drug dealers compete in regional oligopoly markets and this
reduces their power to set prices. Furthermore, UNODC (2011) explains that
the revenues of Colombian drug dealers are less than one third of the revenues of
international traﬃckers. This implies that Colombians may not have monopsony
power.
However, in order to account for common supply shocks I control for the price
of cocaine in the cities of Colombia. My hypothesis is that this price may work
as a reservation price for Colombian drug dealers and will pick up the common
supply shocks that may aﬀect all prices. Figure 2.7 shows the evolution of the
wholesale prices of cocaine in the consuming regions (US and EU) and the price
of cocaine in Colombian cities.
Figure 2.7: Wholesale price of cocaine in Consuming regions and price of cocaine
in Colombia
Source: World Drug Report – UNODC. Anti-narcotics Unit – Colombian National Police.
This section has two parts. Firstly, I explain how I construct the potential co-
caine traﬃc network using the roads of Colombia. Secondly, I explain how, using
my network and the international prices of cocaine, I can identify diﬀerent pro-
files of violence according to the comparative advantage in traﬃcking of each
municipality.
2.3.1 Building the internal cocaine traﬃc network
The simplest way to understand the network of potential internal cocaine traf-
ficking for the proposes of this work is the following: I want to find the way that
the cocaine produced in some areas of Colombia reach the border of the country
to be shipped to the international markets. The network N (O, V, D) is defined
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by the set of origin nodes O = {o1, . . . , oO¯} which are the municipalities with
coca bush fields. V = {v1, . . . , vV¯ } is the set of intermediate transit points which
will be the municipalities crossed by the roads used to transport the cocaine.
D = {d1, . . . , dD¯} is the set of ports to international markets at the Colombian
border6.
Then, I define a route z as the triple from an origin , o, some intermediate points
(edges) , v, and a final port , d. Thus z = (o, v, d). In other words, a cocaine
traﬃcking route is the way in which a drug dealer takes cocaine from a producing
municipality to a municipality on the border using the road network. At the
border, the dealer sells the cocaine to an international traﬃcker.
In order to construct the network I use the following data. Firstly, the set O
of origin nodes contains the municipalities which had coca bushes at some point
from 2001 to 2009. This information is based on the yearly report on coca crops
by UNODC (2010). Secondly, the set of destination nodes – D – includes the mu-
nicipalities at the Colombian border that have road access. Finally, to build up
the set V of intermediate points, I use information from the network of primary
and secondary roads in 2005 from the Minister of Transport and the SIG-OT in
Colombia. Figure 2.8 shows the spacial distribution of the origin nodes, destina-
tion nodes and road networks.
Figure 2.8: Colombian Internal Cocaine Traﬃc Network
6O¯, V¯ , D¯ are the total number of origins, intermediate nodes and destinations respectively.
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To construct the set of feasible routes for cocaine traﬃcking I look for the shortest
route to link each origin o with each destination d following a predeterminate
rule of transit. Initially I use two diﬀerent rules. The first rule prioritises to the
primary road network over the secondary road network. The second assumes the
reverse. I define N to be the full set of feasible routes for cocaine traﬃcking.
Table 2.1 summarises the main features of the set N . I found 11453 routes from
224 origins to 47 destinations. The average length of each route is 1556 km. This
is similar to the distance between Boston and Chicago in the US, or Madrid and
Milan in Europe. The length of the routes vary from 36 to 4065 km. The latter
is approximately the same distance as Tampa to Los Angeles or Lisbon to Kiev.
The routes mainly follow secondary roads. On average, only 36% of each route
uses primary roads. This feature was expected given that the origin nodes are
usually in areas with low development and poor infrastructure.
The lower panel of table 2.1 shows characteristics of the set of routes which link
each origin with the closest destination. The average length of this set is 504 km
(around the same distance from San Diego to Las Vegas, or Paris to Geneva). It
is important to point out that the median length of the shortest route set is 508
km. This means that for half of the cocaine producing municipalities traﬃckers
need to be on the road for at least 500 km. What is more, 90% of the origin
nodes have a minimum distance route shorter than 940 km.
Table 2.1: Cocaine Traﬃc Network – Descriptive Statistics
Main Features
Origin Nodes 224
End Nodes 47
Total Routes 11453
Statistics Mean S. D. Min Max
Total Length (Km) 1556.3 820.9 35.6 4065.1
Main Road Proportion 0.36 0.12 0 0.94
Number of Departments 5.31 2.95 1 15
Shortest route distribution Mean S. D. Min Max
Total Length (Km) 540.8 376.6 35.6 1641.5
Percentile Length (Km)
10% 126.5
50% 508.9
90% 940.83
This set only include routes using the road network. It doesn’t include routes finishing in the border with Ecuador because I
assume this is an entry border and not an exit of cocaine. There are no routes reaching the borders with Brazil and Peru.
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Nevertheless, this network will only explain the traﬃc travelling along roads.
This excludes the use of rivers and traﬃcking via international or small private
airports to fly directly from Colombia to other countries. Despite this limitation
the validity of my analysis is supported by the following facts: After the fall of
the big drug cartels at the beginning of the 90’s the reduction in air traﬃc reduce
gave more importance to road traﬃc that sought out access to sea ports in order
to reach international markets.
According to reports of Colombian Illegal Drugs Observatory – ODC, by 2009,
54% of the cocaine seized in Colombia was at sea, 24% was on country roads.
Only 3% was seized at airports (DNE (2002, 2010)). What is more, the number
of detected illegal air routes drop from 639 to 88 between 1990 to 2006. Finally,
information from the National Anti-Narcotics Bureau (DNE) also shows that
the number of airplanes confiscated dropped from 33 to 22 (with a peak of 93 in
1998). The number of vehicles confiscated increased from 311 to 1233 (the largest
number of vehicles confiscated in a given year was 1987 in 2003).
The analysis did not find ways to reach the borders with Panama, Peru and
Brazil. Moreover, I exclude the routes that finish at the border with Ecuador
because I assume that this border is an entry for coca leaves or other inputs
for production rather than an exit of cocaine to international markets. I also
assume that taking the cocaine to the Colombian Pacific coast directly strongly
dominates the strategy of taking the cocaine to Ecuador to go to the Ecuadorian
Pacific coast afterwards.
2.3.2 Estimating the eﬀects of cocaine traﬃcking on viol-
ence
In this work identification relies on the following statement: Drug dealers react
to changes on the relative profits that they could gain in diﬀerent international
markets. As described in section 2.2, there are two main international cocaine
consuming regions, US and EU. Cocaine going to the US can be transported
either via the Pacific Ocean or the Caribbean sea, whereas the cocaine destined
for Europe is transported via the Caribbean or through Venezuela across the
Atlantic or West Africa.
As a result, certain municipalities in Colombia are better situated than others
to serve each of these markets. Therefore, as demand of cocaine declined in the
United States and grew in Europe during the 2000’s (as shown in the panel a of
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figure 2.9), the amount of cocaine transported along diﬀerent international routes
has also changed (panel b of the same figure). I claim that the amount of cocaine
moved through some municipalities would has also changed. This, I argue, give
us an exogenous source of variation for the levels of violence.
Figure 2.9: Relative Revenues (US/EU) and International Cocaine Traﬃc Flows
(1998-2009)
(a) Relative Revenue (b) International Traﬃc Flows
Source: World Drug Report – UNODC. The information of traﬃc come from Map 22 and 23 page 122 WDR 2011 UNODC (2011).
NA = North America (US, Mexico and Canada) and EU = European Union + EFTA countries.
Given the evidence presented in figures 2.4 and 2.2, we would expect violence to
be focused on the routes to the US using the Pacific and the Caribe in the 1990’s,
while, in the 2000’s we should expect that the optimal traﬃcking of cocaine
would move to the border with Venezuela as demand in Europe increases. Then,
violence would shift to a diﬀerent set of municipalities.
Consequently, this thesis exploits the time variation in cocaine prices in con-
sumer countries, and the eﬀects on the location of the cocaine traﬃckers within
Colombia, to identify the eﬀect on the levels of violence. In order to link the
internal traﬃc network with international market behaviour I cluster the routes
by the border where each route finishes. Thus, I declare F to be the set of fron-
tiers where each route will belong to one f 2 F ={Atlantic, Venezuela North,
Venezuela South, Pacific}7.
Moreover, the complete potential traﬃcking network just described contains some
routes which are potentially implausible due to their length. In the estimations I
restrict the network to including only reasonably long routes. As shown in figure
7Venezuela North includes the department of Guajira, Cesar, Norte de Santander and Boy-
acá. Venezuela South Arauca, Vichada and Guanía. What is more, there are no routes leaving
the country through Brazil and Peru. I do is not use the border with Ecuador because this
frontier could be more an entering point of coca coming from Bolivia and Peru but not an exit
to the American market. In other words, going directly to the Pacific strongly dominates the
strategy of leaving to Ecuador to reach the Pacific ocean afterwards.
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2.10 the set of municipalities varies according to the definition of plausible routes.
Figure 2.10: Municipalities in the Internal Cocaine Traﬃc by the Maximum
Length of the route.
(a) Minimum Length (b) Length  500km (c) Length  1000km (d) Length  1500km
(499) (379) (633) (760)
Author calculations. †Municipalities part of each traﬃcking network in parentheses
One can analyse the eﬀect of drug traﬃc assuming that drug dealers minimise the
cost of transport. Therefore, from each municipality with coca fields traﬃckers
will only use the route with the minimum length. This is the strategy was pre-
viously used by Dell (2011). Alternatively, we can assume that drug traﬃckers
never use routes longer than 500 km, 1000 km or 1500 km in order to minimise
the time spent on the roads, which means time at risk.
Once I fixed the maximum length of the routes and clustered them by border of
exit, identification relies on the fact that diﬀerent exits (frontiers) have compar-
ative advantage in regards to diﬀerent international markets. Determining which
market is served by each cluster is diﬃcult. However there are two cases where
this link is clearer” the Pacific coast and the southern border with Venezuela. On
the one hand, if a traﬃcker sells his cocaine on the Pacific coast, the final des-
tination of that parcel will almost certain be the US market. On the other hand,
if this cocaine exists Colombia through the southern frontier with Venezuela, the
final destination is most likely Europe. The map on figure 2.11 shows the main
international traﬃcking routes.
UNODC (2012) reports that, between 2006 and 2008, 51% of the cocaine in
Europe came from Venezuela while only 11% came from the Caribbean. The
studies also suggest that around 67% of the cocaine in the US came from Mexican
cartels who buy it in the Andean countries.
Following the identification statement, I define V iomt to be the measure of viol-
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Figure 2.11: International cocaine traﬃcking routes
Map from Google Maps. The routes were drawn base on UNODC (2011)
ence on municipality m at period t. Furthermore, the dummy variable Dmf will
be equal to 1 if the municipality m belongs to a route that finishes at frontier
f 2 F and zero otherwise. What is more, P◆t is the wholesale price of cocaine
at market ◆ 2 M = {US, EU}. It is important to remember that in order to
account for supply shocks that aﬀect the final prices I subtract the price of co-
caine in Colombia from each international price. I define P◆t = p◆t pCOL, t where
◆ 2M = {US, EU}. Equation 2.1 summarises my first approach.
V iomt =
X
f
 fDmf +
X
◆
X
f
 ◆fP◆tDmf + ⇢Xmt +M + T + µmt (2.1)
In this case, V iomt is a linear function on each cluster dummyDmf , the interaction
of each cluster and each international price P◆t, some municipality controls Xmt,
municipality fixed eﬀects M , year fixed eﬀects T and error term µmt. Therefore,
 ◆f will capture the eﬀect of the price of international market ◆ over the muni-
cipalities involve in the cocaine traﬃcking that finishes on frontier f . Then, if
 ◆f > 0 the municipalities in cluster f are part of the traﬃcking of cocaine to the
international market ◆. Contrarily,  ◆f  0 if cluster f has comparative advantage
to the other market. Table 2.2 summarises the expected sign of each  ◆f .
So far each  ◆f will capture the average reaction of each cluster to each interna-
tional price. However, inside each cluster there is heterogeneity in terms of the
competitive advantages of each municipality. In order to capture this heterogen-
eity, I estimate the eﬀect of the length of each traﬃcking route on the violence at
municipality level.
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Table 2.2: Expected direction of the violent reaction after an increase in the
international price of cocaine in each consuming region
Traﬃcking cluster
International Price Pacific Atlantic Venezuela - North Venezuela - South
US + ? ? -
EU - ? ? +
I have already argued that drug traﬃckers prefer shorter routes in order to min-
imise the risk of interception. Therefore, in addition to the restriction I use over
the maximum length of the routes in the network, I define ⇡mf = g
 
L¯mf
 
to be
a function of the average length of the routes that cross over the municipality m
and go to frontier f . If ⇡mf is a proxy of the profitability of each municipality
m in the cluster f , we could assume that @⇡mf
@L¯mf
< 0. The function I use in this
analysis will be ⇡mf = 1exp(L¯mf) where L¯mf is the average length of the routes that
go over municipality m to frontier f . Thus, equation 2.1 can be complemented
in the following way.
V iomt =
X
f
 fDmf+
X
◆
X
f
{ ◆fP◆tDmf +  ◆fP◆t⇡mf}+⇢Xmt+ ◆+t+µmt (2.2)
Where  ◆f will capture the marginal eﬀect of the competitive advantage that
shorter routes have for cocaine traﬃcking. I expect that  ◆f > 0 if the cluster f
supply to the market ◆.
Once I define the violence indicator and the maximum length of the routes in
the traﬃc network, the latest reduced form analysis captures diﬀerent violent
profiles as responses to diﬀerent reactions to the international price of cocaine
at consumer markets. Then, when researchers want to evaluate the impact of
violence over household behaviour, my instrument provides exogenous changes in
violence orthogonal to the characteristics of the households in the analysis.
2.4 The Data
In this section I describe the data I use to estimate the eﬀect of cocaine traﬃcking
on violence. The most important right hand side variable is the potential cocaine
traﬃcking. In the last section I already explained how I did build up the potential
cocaine traﬃcking network and the data I used.
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However, I have not defined the variables of analysis on the left hand side. This
work would focus the analysis in the impact of potential internal cocaine traﬃc on
homicides at municipality level, and the location and actions of the illegal armed
groups. Table 2.10 in the appendix 2.A lists the data I use in my estimations. I
already describe the key variables in terms of international cocaine markets and
the internal cocaine traﬃc. Therefore, in this section I focus on describing the
variables of violence.
My analysis begins with a model of potential cocaine traﬃcking and homicides.
Homicides are the most prevalent violent crime. Firstly, figure 2.12 shows the
yearly evolution of the homicide rate in Colombia8. As we can observe in this
figure, the homicide rate moves from 80 to 40 with an average of 50 (see table
2.3).
At the beginning of the 1990’s the Colombian homicide rate was at it largest value
of 80 when the country was at war with the big drug cartels. Afterwards, the rate
felt almost 30 points from 1991 to 1995. From 1996 to 2003 the violence increases
again to reach a new high by 2002: 69.6 homicides per 100000 habitants. This
increase is consequence of the war that involve left wing guerrillas, right wing
paramilitary armies and State forces. There were 28603 homicides in Colombia
in 2002 (see Sánchez et al. (2003)). After 2003 the violence in Colombia shows a
sharp reduction to reach a minimum rate of 35 by 2008. The latest eﬀect has been
the result of multiple policies including strong military investment (with funds
from the US government) and a peace process with the paramilitary armies (Mejia
and Restrepo (2008)).
Figure 2.12: Homicide Rate Statistics (1990 - 2009)
Notes: Vital statistics – DANE. Author calculations †Homicide data source: rate is measure as homicides per 100000 habitants.
The sample includes 1014 municipalities.
Figure 2.12 also includes the average and the standard deviation of the muni-
8All the violent rates and the count of the event per 100000 habitants. vioRate =
vio
population1000000
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cipality homicide rate for each year of analysis. As we can see the within year
average of the municipality homicide rate was smaller than the national rate be-
fore 2003, especially before 1996. This fact shows that the homicides were focused
in the main cities while the rates in smaller were smaller. The reduction of this
gap shows a geographical change in violence, where homicides moved from the
cities to small towns in the countryside. Finally, the within year standard devi-
ation shows similar trends to the mean. The period with larger variation among
municipalities was from 1998 to 2003.
It is important to point out that Colombian average homicide rate is considerably
larger than the rates in developed countries. The United Kingdom and United
State currently have a homicide rate of 1 and 5 respectively. Even after 2005
when rates decreased, the value of the Colombian homicide rate was still larger
than the Mexican rate, which for example in 2011 was of 23 homicides per 100000
habitants.
Table 2.3 complements the descriptive analysis and shows the main statistics of
the homicide rates by gender and age. The maximum homicide rate is for adults
– 15 to 44. The homicide rate for this age group is 88 while in the rate of the
younger population is never larger than 3. Another important feature of the
homicides is the significant gap between male and female homicides. The average
male rate is 90.54 while the female rate is 8.67. The final part of table 2.3 shows
how on average 90% of the homicides in the Colombian municipalities are men.
Moreover, figure 2.13 shows the geographic features of the homicide rate. This
analysis help us to identify the hot-spots base on the intensity of conflict and its
variability. This is the key feature I exploit using the reactions of diﬀerent areas
to the changes in international cocaine prices. As we can see, the violence spread
in a heterogeneous way over the country resulting in more intense conflict over
the south east and north west areas. The border with Venezuela shows as well
high violence on some towns. Panel b shows the within municipality standard
deviation. The highest variation is in some municipalities in the north west in
the region of Antioquia, where the Medellín cartel used to have control. What
is more, the south east of the country, where the left wing guerrillas have more
power, shows a very high standard deviation.
The second set of violent variables for the analysis is related with the presence
and actions of the Illegal Armed Groups – IAG. Figure 2.14 shows the propor-
tion of Colombian municipalities with activity of one of the main illegal groups:
The 2 largest left wing guerrillas FARC and ELN, and the union of right wing
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Table 2.3: Homicide rates descriptive statistics (1990 - 2009)†
Full Sample
mean sd min max
Total homicide rate 50.34 61.57 0 1036
4 y.o. or less 1.82 13.19 0 549
5 to 14 y.o. 2.66 12.21 0 362
15 to 44 y.o. 88.07 113.47 0 2576
45 to 64 y.o. 56.83 93.87 0 1613
65 y.o. or older 26.40 76.64 0 1681
within municipality s.d. (Total) 34.97 30.04 0 283
Male homicide rate 90.54 111.01 0 1851
4 y.o. or less 1.90 17.89 0 645
5 to 14 y.o. 3.41 18.30 0 685
15 to 44 y.o. 160.46 207.43 0 4802
45 to 64 y.o. 101.25 169.43 0 3409
65 y.o. or older 45.10 135.48 0 2606
within municipality s.d. (Total) 63.52 53.37 0 491
Female homicide rate 8.67 17.89 0 288
4 y.o. or less 1.71 18.52 0 1149
5 to 14 y.o. 1.88 13.95 0 552
15 to 44 y.o. 13.32 31.91 0 619
45 to 64 y.o. 10.32 43.99 0 1000
65 y.o. or older 7.58 58.15 0 2857
within municipality s.d. (Total) 12.29 10.65 0 104
Male homicide proportion - male homicidestotal homicides
Total 0.91 0.16 0 1
4 y.o. or less 0.55 0.47 0 1
5 to 14 y.o. 0.67 0.43 0 1
15 to 44 y.o. 0.92 0.16 0 1
45 to 64 y.o. 0.91 0.22 0 1
65 y.o. or older 0.86 0.31 0 1
Notes: Vital statistics – DANE. Author calculations †Homicide data source: rate is measure as homicides per 100000 habitants.
The sample includes 1014 municipalities.
paramilitary armies AUC.
As we can see, FARC is the group with the largest presence around the country.
In 2002, they were in 42% of the Colombian municipalities. After 2002, the war
against the government and other illegal groups reduced their presence to only
15% of the municipalities by 2008. Meanwhile, the second guerrilla group – ELN
– was in 10% of the Colombian towns until 1999. Thus they were similar to FARC
at that time. After 2002 ELN reduced their actions year by year, such that in
2008, they were active in only 4% of the municipalities.
The AUC increased their actions sharply from 1997 to 2005 while combating
40
2. Internal Cocaine Traﬃcking and Violence in Colombia 41
Figure 2.13: Within municipality homicide rate mean and standard deviation.
(a) Mean (b) Standard Deviation
Source: DANE – Vital Statistics (Deaths report). Homicide rate = homicides per 100000 habitants. Within municipality statistics
are the mean and standard deviation of each municipality from 1990 to 2009. The overall mean is 50.33 and the standard deviation
is 61.56897.
guerrilla groups. The clash trend is linked with the expansion of the paramilit-
ary armies. After 2005, following a peace process, the AUC functioned in less
municipalities. By 2008, they were present in only 5% of municipalities.
Figure 2.14: Presence of the Illegal Armies in Colombia (% of municipalities)
Source: CEDE and Human Rights Observatory – Vice-Presidency of Colombia, author calculations. Each cell indicates the %
of municipalities where a group have at least one illegal action reported. A municipality with clash is defined as a municipality
where there were reports of actions of 2 or more groups.
Table 2.4 summarises the evolution of the diﬀerent actions of the illegal groups.
Terrorist attacks are the actions used in more municipalities – 17% over the
period 1998 to 2009. The highest use was in 2002 where 28% of the Colombian
municipalities reported a terrorist attack. Harassment is the second action with
11% mean. The actions targeting military forces, like ambushes and attacking
military bases, have an average of 5% with a maximum of 7% in 2002.
Finally, my estimations will control for year and municipality level fixed eﬀects
and some municipality level variables. These are described on table 2.11 in ap-
pendix 2.A.
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Table 2.4: Illegal Armies presence and actions
Terrorist Attack to Land Illegal
attacks Ambush military Harassment piracy army
base actions
Overall statistics
mean 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.29
sd 0.38 0.22 0.18 0.31 0.30 0.45
Yearly %
1998 0.18 0.05 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.29
1999 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.32
2000 0.20 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.36
2001 0.17 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.17 0.34
2002 0.28 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.18 0.42
2003 0.23 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.41
2004 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.30
2005 0.19 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.29
2006 0.22 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.28
2007 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.19
2008 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.14
2009 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.11
Source: Human Rights Observatory – Vice-Presidency of Colombia, author calculations. Each cell indicates the % of with at
least one action reported.
2.5 Results
Before showing the results of my estimations, I still need to set the maximum
length restriction to the cocaine traﬃcking network. Following previous works I
could have assumed that a profit maximising drug dealer would use the shortest
route to ship his cocaine parcel. In that case, the optimal network would be such
that I use only the shortest route from each cropping municipality (figure 2.10.a).
However, this would reduce the traﬃcking network to only one route from each
origin node. This means that each route would be easily traceable by the police
and other drug dealers. Using an unique route does not seem to be optimal from
the point of view of a traﬃcker. For that reason I do not use this network.
From table 2.1 and figure 2.10 I could support the choice of the maximum length
of 1000 km for my analysis. Firstly, figure 2.10.b shows how using only routes
shorter than 500km creates a clear division between each of the frontier clusters.
However, I will be using only the network from 50% of the possible origin muni-
cipalities. Secondly, when I include all the cropping areas (using 1500 km as the
maximum length of the routes), each frontier cluster includes municipalities far
away from each other. What is more, there are large regions where the clusters
overlap each other. Then, my estimation strategy would not clearly identify the
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average reaction to international prices within cluster comparative advantages in
traﬃcking.
Nevertheless, when I set the maximum distance to 1000 km, I include 90% of the
origin municipalities and I keep a clear division between the diﬀerent traﬃcking
regions. The resulting clusters are shown on the figure 2.15.
Figure 2.15: Municipalities in the Drug Traﬃc Network by Cluster
Only using routes shorter than 1000km
(a) Atlantic (b) Ven.North (c) Ven.South (d) Pacific
2.5.1 The eﬀect of drug traﬃcking on homicides
Once I set up the cocaine traﬃcking network I estimate equations 2.1 and 2.2.
I standardise the homicide rate in order to simplify the comparability of models
and make the reading and interpretation of my results easier.
When I estimate equation 2.1 the coeﬃcients in table 2.5 have the expected
direction. On the one hand, the municipalities in the Pacific cluster are oriented
to the US market and homicide rates increase when the price of cocaine in United
States increases. On the other hand, the violence increases in region at the south
frontier with Venezuela when the price of cocaine increases in Europe or decreases
in the United States; the latter could be understand as a substitution eﬀect.
Additionally, the clusters of Atlantic and the northern border with Venezuela
seem to be oriented to the US market because they increase their violent rates
when the United States market increases its profitability relative to the European
market.
Finally, there is evidence of substitution eﬀects over the border with Venezuela.
When the price of cocaine increases in the United States the homicide rates rises
in the municipalities involved in the traﬃcking towards the northern part of the
border with Venezuela and lowers in the municipalities involved in the traﬃcking
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towards the southern part. When the price that increases is the one in the
European market the opposite happens. There may be some drug traﬃckers that
move between the north and the south of that border depending on where they
expect to get higher revenues.
In the second model – table 2.5 – my estimation includes the clusters that only
serve one market (Pacific and Venezuela South). As we can see, the statistical
significance and signs do not change, what is more, the joint significance F test
over the traﬃcking variables increases from 10.28 to 20.77.
Table 2.5: OLS of Potential Cocaine Traﬃcking Network on municipality hom-
icide rate
Df
P◆
US EU US EU
Model 1 Model 2
Pacific 0.734*** -0.022 0.751***
(0.126) (0.183) (0.129)
Atlantic 0.343*** -0.031
(0.116) (0.158)
Ven. South -0.228** 0.499***
(0.112) (0.157)
Ven. North 0.330** -0.372* 0.237***
(0.138) (0.217) (0.091)
FTEST 10.28 20.77
R2 0.50 0.50
Mpios 1122 1122
N 21395 21395
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses (1122 mpios). The cocaine network includes only the routes shorter than
1000 kilometres (LR  1000km). All regressions follow equation 2.1 including year fixed eﬀect, municipality fixed eﬀects, GDP
per capita at departmental level, logarithm of the population and a dummy if the municipality have coca crops at some point
between 1990 - 2009 and its interaction with the international prices of cocaine, a dummy for the presidential periods of Alvaro
Uribe Vela in Colombia and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, a dummy variable if the municipality belongs to the CCT programme
Familias en Acción. The dependent variable is standardised - Mean = 50.34 and Standard deviation = 61.57. * p < 0.1 , **
p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
Likewise, table 2.6 show the results of the estimation of the model in equation
2.2. The eﬀect is weighted using a function of the average length of the routes
that go through each municipality to check if within the cluster municipality
competitiveness will increase the violent reaction9. For that reason, in this case I
only interact the profit function with the price I assume each cluster is supplying
to. In section 2.3, I set the Pacific cluster to supply to the US market, and
the cluster Venezuela south as the main exit to the European market. After
9Is good to remember that I am using and inverse exponential function of the form ⇡mf =
1
exp(L¯mf)
where L¯mf is the average length of the routes that go over municipality m to frontier
f .
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establishing the initial results from table 2.5, I fix both Atlantic and Venezuela
North as US oriented clusters. For this reason, I do not interact the profit function
of Pacific, Atlantic and Venezuela North with the price of cocaine in Europe.
Additionally, I do not interact the price of the cocaine in the US with the profit
function of the Venezuela South cluster.
Table 2.6 shows the results of estimation equation 2.2. The upper panel shows the
results of the interaction of each traﬃcking cluster dummy and the international
prices as I have already shown in table 2.5. The lower panel shows the interaction
of the price and the profit proxy I describe in section 2.3.
Table 2.6: OLS of Potential Cocaine Traﬃcking Network on municipality hom-
icide rate – extended model
P◆
US EU US EU
Model 1 Model 2
Df Pacific 0.592*** -0.033 0.585***
(0.132) (0.183) (0.128)
Atlantic 0.234* -0.025
(0.121) (0.159)
Ven. South -0.252** 0.384** 0.117
(0.114) (0.152) (0.107)
Ven. North 0.304** -0.443*
(0.150) (0.227)
Df⇡f Pacific 1.542*** 1.665***
(0.358) (0.349)
Atlantic 0.033
(0.332)
Ven. South 0.662** 0.486
(0.334) (0.304)
Ven. North 0.434
(0.721)
FTEST 9.17 16.65
R2 0.50 0.49
Mpios 1122 1122
N 21395 21395
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses (1122 mpios). The cocaine network includes only the routes shorter than
1000 kilometres (LR  1000km). All regressions follow equation 2.1 including year fixed eﬀect, municipality fixed eﬀects, GDP
per capita at departmental level, logarithm of the population and a dummy if the municipality have coca crops at some point
between 1990 - 2009 and its interaction with the international prices of cocaine, a dummy for the presidential periods of Alvaro
Uribe Vela in Colombia and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, a dummy variable if the municipality belongs to the CCT programme
Familias en Acción. The dependent variable is standardised – Mean = 50.34 and Standard deviation = 61.57. * p < 0.1 , **
p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
My results suggest that homicide rates in the Pacific have an extra reaction to an
increase in cocaine prices in the United States when the municipalities are part
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of shorter routes. As I explain above municipalities with shorter routes could
be more profitable in terms of traﬃcking. An increase in the price will have a
stronger eﬀect on more profitable municipalities. I find similar eﬀects for the
municipalities in the south border with Venezuela when the price of cocaine in
Europe is the one who increases. For the other clusters, the distance does not
seem to be a significant variable for the drug dealers’ optimal choices. As we can
see, the F test over my traﬃc variables are around 10. This confirms that drug
traﬃcking on roads is indeed an important factor of violence in Colombia.
Thus, I have only analysed the eﬀect of drug traﬃc on the municipality homicides.
However, the data allows us to study whether the violence caused by drug traﬃc
targets specific populations. I estimate equation 2.2 for the diﬀerent homicide
rates using all the traﬃc clusters, using only Pacific and Venezuela South as I
did before. We can see in tables 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14 on appendix 2.A that the
coeﬃcient structure does not change notably between specifications. Although,
as I compile on figure 2.16, the joint significance test varies with age and gender.
From both panels I conclude that drug traﬃc explains the male homicides much
better than female deaths. What is more, the model fits the best for adults
between 14 and 45 years old, while traﬃc seems not to have explicative power
over child homicides or homicides of persons older than 45 years. As we saw
before, 91% of the homicides are male, which explains why the potential cocaine
traﬃcking has such a poor explicative power over female homicides.
Figure 2.16: Join significance test of Cocaine Traﬃcking Network on municipality
homicide rate by age and gender
(a) Model 1 (b) Model 2
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses (1122 mpios). The cocaine network includes only the routes shorter than
1000 kilometres (LR  1000km). All regressions follow equation 2.1 including year fixed eﬀect, municipality fixed eﬀects, GDP
per capita at departmental level, logarithm of the population and a dummy if the municipality have coca crops at some point
between 1990 - 2009 and its interaction with the international prices of cocaine, a dummy for the presidential periods of Alvaro
Uribe Vela in Colombia and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, a dummy variable if the municipality belongs to the CCT programme
Familias en Acción. The dependent variable is standardised. * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
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2.5.2 The eﬀect of drug traﬃcking on the actions of Illegal
Armed Groups
The latest section focused on the analysis of cocaine traﬃc on homicides. Now I
turn to study the eﬀect of cocaine traﬃc on the behaviour of the Illegal Armed
Groups – IAG – in Colombia. As shown by Mejia and Rico (2010), the IAG are
part of the country’s cocaine business. As I have shown previously, I want to know
if guerrillas and paramilitary armies move and attack diﬀerent municipalities to
pursue the rents of drug markets. For this reason, I use the same strategy over
dummy variables which are equal to 1 if a municipality reports actions by a
certain group. What is more, I estimate the eﬀect of traﬃc on diﬀerent actions
of illegal armed groups such as terrorist attacks (to population) or attacks to
military bases.
I estimate equation 2.2 for a set of variables related with the activity of the
illegal armed groups. Table 2.7 shows the joint significance test for the variables
of interest10. Unfortunately, my estimations do not fit as well as they did when the
violence indicator was the homicide rate. However, the model seems to explain
part of the positioning of guerrillas and the terrorist attacks. As we can see in
table 2.15 (appendix 2.A), the probability that a municipality has an action from
the ELN increases in the Pacific, Atlantic and Venezuela North clusters when the
price in the US increases. Similarly, the ELN presence increases in Venezuela
South if the European price increases. The length of the routes in each cluster
does not seem to be important for the location of this guerrilla group.
Table 2.8 shows the results of the estimations of my first specification. As we can
see in the first column the presence of ELN follows the model I explain before and
the results I found for the homicide rates. In this case, the joint significance test
increases to 7.79 which is not very far away from the critical value of 10. However,
leaving only the clusters of Pacific and the southern border with Venezuela reduces
the explicative power of the model. This was an expected result because the
main area of influence of ELN is the north border with Venezuela, a region called
Catatumbo.
In the case of FARC, the last column of table 2.8 suggests very interesting be-
haviour. As we can see the presence of FARC reduces in the Pacific when the
price of the cocaine in the United States rises. As I explain before, guerrilla
armies choose the level of participation in traﬃc, therefore, if the FARC groups
10P
◆
P
f { ◆fP◆tDmf +  ◆fP◆t⇡mf}
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Table 2.7: Join significance test of Potential Cocaine Traﬃcking Network on the
presence of diﬀerent illegal armies and diﬀerent actions.
Dependent variable F test
Presence (1990 – 2008) FARC 3.51
ELN 5.22
AUC⇤ 2.44
Clash 3.23
Actions (1998 - 2008) Terrorist attack 4.09
Ambush 1.46
Attack to military base 2.83
Harassment 2.18
Land piracy 3.42
Illegal army action (any) 5.03
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. The cocaine network includes only the routes shorter than 1000
kilometres (LR  1000km). All regressions follow equation 2.2 including year fixed eﬀect, municipality fixed eﬀects, GDP per
capita, logarithm of the population and a dummy if the municipality have coca crops at some point between 1990 - 2009.* p < 0.1
, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
⇤There is no information for the AUC before 1997.
in the Pacific region decide to share the risk and do not get involve in the traﬃc
when the price of cocaine increases, the traﬃcker will gain more power over the
territory and move the guerrilla armies out.
Conversely, at the border with the south of Venezuela, FARC have historically
been more powerful and therefore have more control over the illegal activities,
including cocaine traﬃc. Thus, their participation in the internal traﬃc will be
larger than in the Pacific, allowing them to gain the benefits of price increases in
the European wholesale cocaine market.
Finally, when analysing the actions of illegal groups it is important to point out
from table 2.7 that cocaine prices seem to explain part of the terrorist attacks but
have no power to explain actions that imply army strategy and confrontations like
ambushes, harassments or base attacks. The results on terrorism seem to follow
the same behaviour of the FARC presence which is rational given the importance
of this guerrilla group in Colombia. Nevertheless, the F test still very small.
2.6 Conclusions and policy implications
This work aims to contribute to the analysis of the economic consequences and
cost of violent crime, armed conflict and war. The main contribution of this
chapter is the use of international cocaine prices and internal potential cocaine
traﬃcking network to find exogenous violent shocks at municipality level. I ana-
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Table 2.8: Potential Drug Traﬃcking on the Probability of the Presence of Guer-
rillas (linear probability model)
ELN FARC
P◆ Df model 1 model 2 model 1 model 2
P◆Df US Pacific 0.117** -0.001 -0.128** -0.131***
(0.046) (0.032) (0.059) (0.044)
Atlantic 0.088** 0.019
(0.037) (0.042)
Ven.South -0.092* 0.095
(0.051) (0.059)
Ven.North 0.225*** -0.013
(0.052) (0.057)
EU Pacific -0.154*** -0.002
(0.045) (0.051)
Atlantic 0.008 0.042
(0.039) (0.042)
Ven.South 0.127*** 0.100*** 0.084 0.136***
(0.049) (0.031) (0.055) (0.036)
Ven.North -0.081 0.025
(0.062) (0.053)
FTEST 7.79 5.34 4.14 12.78
R2 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
Mean % 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.22
Mpios 1096 1096 1096 1096
N 20180 20180 20180 20180
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. The cocaine network includes only the routes shorter than 1000
kilometres (LR  1000km). All regressions follow equation 2.2 including year fixed eﬀect, municipality fixed eﬀects, GDP per
capita, logarithm of the population and a dummy if the municipality have coca crops at some point between 1990 - 2009.* p < 0.1
, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
lyse the case of violent conflict in Colombia where internal war and illegal drug
production and traﬃc have been part of the country’s history for at least 60 years.
My identification relies on the following statement: Drug traﬃckers adjust their
decisions according to changes in the relative expected profits they could get in
international markets. Then, changes in the relative profits from cocaine induce
diﬀerent time/space changes in violence. For this reason we observe that violence
changes accordingly to the municipality comparative advantage in the drug trade.
I construct a network with more than eleven thousand possibilities for taking
cocaine from the producing municipalities to the national borders in order to
ship the cocaine to the US or European markets. Afterwards, I restrict the
network according to the maximum length of the routes and cluster diﬀerent
municipalities in four traﬃcking groups – Atlantic, Venezuela North, Venezuela
South and Pacific. I argue that violence in each cluster rises when the price
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of cocaine in the market being supplied increases. The clearest eﬀect is in the
Pacific region, which serves the US market and Venezuela South which serves the
European Market.
Given that Colombia was the main producer during the period of analysis (1990
- 2009), I use the price of cocaine in the cities of Colombia to capture the eﬀect
of supply shocks in Colombia that may aﬀect the price in the consumer regions.
On the one hand, my reduced form estimation shows that when the cocaine price
in the Unites States increases the homicide rate increases in the municipalities
that are part of the clusters of Pacific, Atlantic and Venezuela North. On the other
hand, homicides increase in the municipalities involved in traﬃcking through the
Southern Venezuelan border when the price of cocaine increases in Europe. The
latest conclusions hold when I weight each municipality according to the average
length of the traﬃcking routes that cross each municipality.
Using the latest analysis I identify the regions which are more sensitive to changes
in the international cocaine prices. Figure 2.17 shows the estimated reaction to
each municipality in Colombia when the price of cocaine increases in the US or
EU. The region that responds more to the US cocaine market is the Northern coast
of the country and the traﬃc over Antioquia, which used to be the headquarters
of the must important coca cartel, the “Medellín Cartel”. Moreover, when the
price of cocaine in Europe increases keeping the US price constant, violence is
expected to rise the most in the Eastern corner of the frontier with Venezuela.
Figure 2.17: Estimated change in homicide rate by 1 dollar increase in the cocaine
price by international market.
(a) + 1 USD in US price (b) + 1 USD in EU price
Finally, I extend my analysis to the behaviour of illegal armies. I show that
guerrillas seem to respond more to the cocaine market. My strategy was not
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explicative of the presence of the paramilitary armies (AUC). Furthermore, ac-
cording to my estimations, the ELN follows closely the rents from controlling
the cocaine routes and the probability of ELN presence increases in the Pacific,
Atlantic and Venezuela North traﬃc clusters when the price in the US increase.
What is more, ELN increases their presence in the Venezuela South cluster when
the returns in the european market rises. Although, FARC guerrillas follow the
cocaine traﬃcking on the cluster of Southern border with Venezuela. They seem
to not get directly involved in the traﬃc of the Pacific to North America.
My strategy and results can be use now to analyse the cost of criminal violence
over municipality institutions and households behaviour. The changes in viol-
ence are driven by drug lords who seek diﬀerent international profits and choose
violence without taking into account household composition and characteristics.
Consequently, I now open a window to analyse diﬀerent consequences of violent
crime. In the following chapter I use my strategy to study the eﬀect of homicides
on teenage fertility.
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Appendix 2.A Support tables
Table 2.9: Duration of Internal Conflicts 1946 - 2001
Type N mean sd min max %(T < 2y) % (T   20y)
Internal Minor Conflict 80 7.25 10.4 0 10 46.2 11.2
Internal Intermediate Conflict 37 11.37 13.9 0 47 29.6 21.6
Internal War 51 11.33 15.5 0 55 35.2 19.6
Source: Data from Gleditsch et al. (2002). Author’s calculations
Table 2.10: Main Data Sources
Group Data description Period Source
Violence Homicides at municipality level 1990 - 2009 CEDE – Human Rights
Observatory – Vice-presidency of
Colombia
1990 - 2009 DANE - Vital statistics - Deaths
Reports
Illegal Armed Groups actions 1990 - 2009 CEDE- Human Rights
Observatory - Vice-presidency of
Colombia
1988 - 2010 CERAC
Terrorist actions 1998 - 2009 Human Rights Observatory -
Vice-presidency of Colombia
Cocaine traﬃc Colombian Road Network 2005 Minister of Transport - IGAC -
SIG-OT
Wholesale cocaine price - Europe
and United States
1990 - 2010 UNODC - World Market Reports
Coca crops in Colombia 2001 - 2010 UNODC - SIMCI
Support data Population 1990 - 2009 DANE: Population estimates
GDP per capita (By department) 1990 - 2009 DANE
Municipalities in Familias en
Acción
2002 - 2009 Acción Social - Econometría S.A.
Table 2.11: Municipality data descriptive statistics
mean sd min max
Municipality Controls
Population - Logarithm 9.54 1.06 5 16
GDP per capita? 4633.19 3812.02 311 28966
With Coca fields (%)‡ 0.25 0.43 0 1
Familias en Acción (%)  0.19 0.39 0 1
Notes: Author calculations
?GDP in thousands of pesos (COP) per year.
‡% of municipalities who have coca fields at some point from 2001 to 2009
 % of municipalities with the CCT programme Familias en Accíon. The programme star in 2002 and increase its presence until
2007.
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Chapter 3
Drugs, Guns and Early Motherhood
in Colombia
3.1 Introduction
“I was 15 when I became a widow, ... Hi died on my legs. In my
heart he left me a great sadness and a reminder I will never forget,
which is my son.” Cielo (17 years old)1
Cielo is one of the main characters of La Sierra - (Dalton et al. (2005)), a docu-
mentary about 3 young who lived in the neighbourhood of La Sierra (Medellín,
Colombia) during the conflict between extreme right-wing paramilitary forces
(AUC) and extreme left-wing guerrillas (FARC). Cielo, who was 17 at the time
of the documentary was already the mother of a 2 year old baby. But she is only
one of many teenage girls who are already mothers living through the war in that
neighbourhood La Sierra.
Colombia is no stranger to the global interest in understating the causes and con-
sequences of teenage pregnancy. Despite the 17% drop of the worldwide Teenage
Fertility Rate (TFR) from 2002 to 2011 (table 3.1) the problem of early mother-
hood is still very important in the public agendas of almost every country. For
example, even after falling 34%, the TFR in low income countries (91.8 babies
born from 1000 women from 15 to 19 years old) are still 1.7 times the world
average and 3.5 times the rate in the OECD countries.
Even though the problem of teenage pregnancy is higher in poor and developing
1Translation from Dalton et al. (2005)
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countries, some high income countries also suﬀer from the increase in the TFR
rates inside their own population. For instance, against the worldwide decreasing
tendency countries like Spain and the United Kingdom showed increases of 18%
and 4% in the TFR from 2002 to 2011.2 .
Table 3.1: Teenage Fertility Rates 2002 - 2011
2002 2011 %Change
World 64.72 52.67 -17%
Low Income Countries 120.23 91.81 -24%
Middle Income Countries 60.35 50.21 -17%
OECD Countries 31.76 25.76 -19%
Source: UN Population Division, World Population Prospects. Teenage Pregnancy Rate
(TFR) is the number of births per 1,000 women ages 15-19.
There is indeed extensive literature that analyses the causes of early childbearing
and the cost to mothers, fathers and the children. Theoretical analyses of the
timing of motherhood build on the initial idea of Becker et al. (1960) and the
later developments of Blackburn et al. (1993). On the one hand, the timing of
motherhood is a function of relative wages and the human capital accumulation of
women. On the other hand, it has been shown that young mothers face reductions
in the accumulation of human capital, labor opportunities, income and their own
health. (Klepinger et al. (1999); Miller (2011); Fletcher (2011); Buckles (2008)).
Furthermore, the outcomes in education, health and labor opportunities for the
oﬀspring of young mothers decrease significantly as well (Klepinger et al. (1999);
Miller (2009, 2011); Buckles (2008); Chevalier and Viitanen (2003); Francesconi
(2008)).
As I described in the previous chapter, many authors have analysed the cost
and consequences of civil war, armed conflict and crime on economic agents.
Furthermore, every single work is challenged by unique problems, depending on
the causes and characteristics of the conflict.
This chapter contributes to both fields by analysing the indirect cost of conflict
and the causes of early motherhood. This work builds up on the puzzle propose
by Flórez et al. (2004) when they analysed the behaviour of teenage fertility in
Colombia. The authors said:
“The increasing tendency in the teenage fertility rate was not expected
given the positive changes in socioeconomic factors at individual level
2According the UN the TFR grows in Spain from 9.4 to 11.1 and from 28.6 to 29.7 in the
United Kingdom between 2000 and 2011.
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(education, labor participation) and in the context (urbanisation, ...”3
Furthermore, supporting the latest statement figure 3.1 compares the GDP per
capita and the TFR of Colombia and its surrounding countries.4 As we can see
in the panel a, the behaviour of Colombia’s GDP does not diﬀer significantly
from the evolution of the GDP per capita region from 1997 to 2009. However,
the fertility rate of Colombia is the only one in the region with a positive slope
before 2002 and a sharp decline afterwards (panel b on the same figure).
As Flórez argues, the increase in babies born to adolescent mothers was not
expected and therefore Colombia should have seen a reduction in the levels of
teenage fertility as the other countries in the region. However, unlike the other
countries of the region, the homicide rate in Colombia was about 3 times greater
in 2002. Figure 3.2 shows the homicide rates of the same countries in the analysis
of figure 3.1. In this case, Colombia shows a very diﬀerent profile in terms of
violence and security.
Figure 3.1: Teenage Fertility Rate and GDP per capita
Colombia and some countries in Latin America and Caribbean 1997 - 2009
(a) GDP per capita (b) Teenage Fertility Rate
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National
Accounts data files. GDP per capita (current US$)
LA is for Latin America and the Caribbean developing countries
Source: UN Population Division, World Population Prospects.
Teenage Pregnancy Rate (TFR) is the number of births per
1,000 women ages 15-19.
LA is for Latin America and the Caribbean developing countries
Subsequently, this chapter claims that violent conflict explains part of the in-
creases of the rate of teenage fertility in Colombia. Specifically, I argue that
when the household is exposed to increases in local violence, the cost-benefit
relationship of postponing motherhood changes. In fact the incentives to be a
young mother increase. Firstly, armed violence reduces the incentives to invest in
3Flórez et al. (2004) Page 10. This is my translation from the following quote in Span-
ish. “La tendencia creciente en la fecundidad adolescente en el país no era esperada dado los
cambios positivos que observamos en algunos determinantes socioeconómicos al nivel individual
(educación, participación laboral) y contextual (urbanización ...”
4Colombia has borders with Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru and Ecuador.
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Figure 3.2: Homicides per 100.000 habitants
Colombia and some countries in Latin America and Caribbean 1997 - 2009
Source: UN Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime’s International Homicide Statistics database. Homicide rate (HOM) is Intentional
homicides per 100,000 people
education. This reduces the expected prize of postponing motherhood. Secondly,
since violence aﬀects men more than women (for instance recruitment in IAG and
gangs and homicides), changes in the sex ratios reducing the expected gains in
the marriage markets. I discuss these two mechanisms later in this chapter.
Similar analyses are found in the literature on household welfare and armed con-
flict. The papers from Abramitzky et al. (2010), Shemyakina (2009) and Valente
(2011) have found interesting relationships between violence of the civil war and
marriage markets and fertility decisions. These authors take advantage of sharp,
localised increases in violence to identify the eﬀects of conflict over households.
However, such sharp increases are not present in the Colombian case of long-
lasting, changing conflict. Thus, in this chapter I use the strategy proposed
in chapter 2. I use the network of potential internal cocaine traﬃcking as an
instrument to identify the causal eﬀect of armed violence over changes in the
teenage fertility profiles at municipality level in Colombia.
Identification relies on the following statement: Drug traﬃckers adjust their de-
cisions according to changes in the relative expected profits they could get in
international markets. Then, changes in the relative international profits from
cocaine induce diﬀerent time/space variations in violence according to the muni-
cipality competitive advantage for drug traﬃc. Further, Colombian drug dealers
compete in regional oligopoly markets and have no power to set prices at interna-
tional markets (Echandia (2013); Kugler et al. (2005)). Thus, changes in violence
due to changes in the potential cocaine traﬃcking are orthogonal to the household
characteristics and to the underline pregnancy profiles of young women.
Consequently, this chapter develops a simple theoretical framework to show how
homicides could aﬀect the cost-benefit function of postponing motherhood. I use
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a discrete duration model in order to estimate the eﬀect of municipality homicide
rates on the pregnancy hazard function of adolescent women. My estimations
use a control function approach using internal drug traﬃc as an instrument of
municipality homicides.
My results suggest that after accounting for endogeneity, one standard deviation
increase in the municipality homicide rate increases the probability of a woman
to become pregnant for the first time before 19 years old by 2.65 p.p. with a
95% confidence interval from 0.07 to 5.23. What is more, an increase in violence
increases the probability of early marriage but reduces the probability of early
sexual intercourse and having a second baby before 19 years old. The latest
results suggest that early pregnancy and marriage is being use by teenage women
as an insurance strategy when they foreseen a reduction in the future utility due
to an increase in local violence.
Hence, this chapter has the following structure. Firstly, section 3.2 describes
the theoretical framework that establishes a base for my estimations. Secondly,
section 3.3 explains my estimation strategy and describes the conditions to assure
identification. Thirdly, section 3.4 describes the data I use. Fourth, in the next
section I show and discuss the results of my estimations. Finally, I conclude.
3.2 A model of pregnancy and violence
In this section I develop a model of women’s fertility choice as the framework
to understand the way in which the local violence could aﬀect the probability of
becoming a young mother.
Before setting up the model, I discuss its constraints. Firstly, this model focuses
only on the decision of first pregnancy. Thus, I do not analyse related decisions
such as the time of marriage or number of children. Secondly, this model only
takes into account the woman’s decision and ignores male decision functions and
matching equilibriums. The main reason for imposing such a restriction to the
model is the lack data for men available for our estimations.
The model builds up on the work of Kearney and Levine (2011), where the
decision of postponing motherhood is driven by the subjective probability of
success. I complement their model while making explicit the role of the marriage
market and the eﬀect of violence on such a market.
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3.2.1 The environment
A woman i has a attractiveness endowment µi and lives over 2 periods t = {0, 1}
which represent teenage and adulthood years. The discount factor is  . µi rep-
resents the set of her personal characteristics that are valuable to men5. What
is more, if she is single and has no children, each period she receives a random
couple xj from the set of men ⌦. I define Gi (xj) = G (xj | µi) = P (x  xj |µi)
to be the cumulative probability distribution that a woman i enters into a couple
with characteristics xj from set ⌦. gi (xj) is the corresponding density probability
distribution.
In each period – t – women gain utility from consumption u (ct), where u is an
increasing and concave function. At t = 0 every woman has consumption c0
with probability 1. At t = 1 women can have either high or low consumption.
Then, c1 = c¯1 with probability q and c1 = c1 with probability 1   q where
c¯1 > c1. Following Kearney and Levine (2011), q is the subjective probability
of getting high consumption c¯1 (economic success). That probability depends on
each woman’s decision at t = 0. If she decides to become a young mother, her
subjective probability of success is qe. While qd is her probability of getting high
consumption if she decides to delay motherhood until t = 1. As Kearney and
Levine (2011), this paper assumes that qe < qd.
Moreover, motherhood gives utility vi (xj) = ↵i + bidij where ↵i is the direct
utility of being a mother and bidij is the utility she gets from the attractiveness
surplus dij = (xj   µi). It is important to point out that women will not accept
any oﬀer and will prefer motherhood only if vi (xj)   0. For oﬀers such that
vi (xj) < 0, the preferred option is to stay single and childless. In addition, baby
care has a fixed cost  units of consumption. Finally, the mother will gain utility
 x when her oﬀspring has grown up.
As follows, the lifetime expected utility of becoming a mother at period 0 when
she gets couple x is:
U ex = u
e
0 (x) +  V
e
x (3.1)
Where, ue0 (x) = u (c0   )+vi (x) is the immediate utility in period 0 meanwhile
V ex = q
eu (c¯1) + (1  qe) u (c1) +  x is her expected utility in period 1. If she
decides to postpone motherhood, her lifetime expected utility would be:
5for example education, income, race, physical characteristics
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Ud = ud0 +  V
d (3.2)
Where ud0 = u (c0) and V d = qd [(1 Gx) (u (c¯1   ) + v (xˆ) + xˆ) +Gxu (c¯1)] + 
1  qd [(1 Gx) (u (c1   ) + v (xˆ) + xˆ) +Gxu (c1)]. Moreover, Gx = Gi (x) is
the probability of getting an oﬀer lower than x which is the minimum oﬀer that a
woman would accept. Furthermore, xˆ =
´
x zg (z) dz is the expected value of the
oﬀer she could receive in period 1.
3.2.2 The turning oﬀer x˜ and the pregnancy decision
Assuming that women are risk neutral - u0 = 1 - for a given oﬀer x a woman
chooses to be a mother at t = 0 if U ex   Ud when:
(v (x)  +   x)    (1 Gx) (v (xˆ)  + xˆ)     q c (3.3)
Equation 3.3 shows the cost-benefit relationship of becoming a young mother.
On the left hand side we describe the benefits of early motherhood. Benefits
come from the gain of expected life time utility of being a mother. Import-
antly, women will never be mothers with probability Gx. The right hand side
 q c =
 
qe   qd  (c¯1   c1) is the gain in subjective consumption due to post-
poning motherhood, which represent the opportunity cost of early childbearing.
If women believe that the gains of motherhood are larger than the subjective loss
in consumption they will prefer to be mothers when young, rather than wait until
adulthood.
In order to explain the eﬀect of violence on women’s pregnancy decisions I define
the turning oﬀer x˜ as the couple such that U ex˜ = Ud:
x˜ =
1
b
[  (⇤xv (xˆ) + q c+ (⇤x xˆ   x˜))  (↵  bµ  (1   ⇤x))] (3.4)
Where ⇤x = 1   Gx is the probability of getting an oﬀer that she will accept in
period 1. Hence, at t = 0 a woman i will decide to be a teenage mother if she
gets a couple x   x˜. Thus, if G rules the distribution of x the probability that a
woman i chooses early motherhood is:
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P (young mother=1) = P (x > x˜ | µi) = 1 Gi (x˜) (3.5)
Hence @P (young mother=1)@x˜ =  gi (x˜)  0. Then, we can analyse the eﬀect of diﬀerent
variables over the pregnancy decision using equations 3.4 and 3.5. Nevertheless,
it is important to describe the variables that aﬀect x˜.
The first part of equation 3.4 – ⇤xv (xˆ) – is the expected value of the expected
couple she could get in period 1. In other words, the first part represents the
auction value of the option to delay. The second part of the equation –  q c –
represents the opportunity cost of not waiting, due to the expected forgone con-
sumption in the future. Thereafter, (⇤x xˆ   x˜) is the gain on the future returns
from oﬀspring, due to postpone motherhood. Following Miller (2009), oﬀspring
from teenage mothers invest less in human capital. Thus, their returns in the fu-
ture may be lower, such that (⇤x xˆ   x˜)   0. Finally, (↵  bµ+ (1   ⇤x))
represents the possible forgone utility if the woman never married. These res-
ults are according to the findings of Blackburn et al. (1993), Cigno and Ermisch
(1989), Ermisch and Pevalin (2004) and Ermisch and Pevalin (2004).
3.2.3 How does conflict aﬀect women’s decision?
Following the analysis, we use equations 3.4 and 3.5 to understand the possible
mechanisms in which the violence aﬀects the probability of being a mother when
young. It is important to point out that this chapter does not analyse the use
of gender and sexual violence in conflict. Previous works such as Lara (2008)
and Pinzón-Paz (2009) studied already the use and the consequences of gender
violence in the Colombian conflict6.
I begin my analysis declaring V ioi the level of conflict violence that a woman
i is exposed to. Then, rewriting equation 3.5 as hi = P (young mother =1 | x˜i)
= 1   Gi (x˜i), where hi is the probability that woman i become a mother when
young (period 0 in the model). Therefore, the influence of violence in the decision
of woman i can be written as @hi@V ioi =  gi (x˜i) @x˜i@V ioi . Given that gi (x˜i) > 0, the
analysis simplifies to the analysis of @x˜i@V ioi from equation 3.4.
As I claim in the introduction, violent crime aﬀects the expectations of young
women regarding their future outcomes in the marriage and labor markets. Ac-
6One can argue that more homicides are correlated with more sexual and gender violence.
I did not find evidence of this correlation. The main reason may be the quality of the data in
sexual and gender violence and the high levels of not reporting.
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cording to the model, I capture the expectations on marriage via ⇤xv (xˆ) and the
expectations in the labor market using  q c.
Firstly, when men are targeted by armed violence, women’s decisions are aﬀected
as well. I asses this channel through changes in the c.d.f. G, specially through
changes in the sex ratio - sr = menwomen , via recruitment of soldiers and killings.
According to a survey of former soldiers from illegal armed groups in Colombia
(DNP (2008)), 91% of the excombatants were men. Almost 70% of these men have
only primary education or less. Pinto et al. (2002) show that 82% of the former
members of the illegal armed groups joined the group when they were 10 to 17
years old. In addition, as I emphasise above, homicides are more prevalent in men
than women. Table 2.3 in chapter 2 shows how 91% of the total homicides are
men, while only 10% were women casualties. Therefore, I contend that decreases
in sex ratio could aﬀect the decision of motherhood in the following ways.
Firstly, when the sex ratio falls (less men) the final probability of find a couple
decreases - @⇤x@V io < 0. Figure 3.3, shows the variability in the change in the
sex ratios in Colombia as a result of the homicides in each municipality. It is
important to point out that no municipality shows a positive change in the sex
ratio. The changes in the ratio are within a range from 0 to -16.6%, showing
large heterogeneity in the eﬀect over diﬀerent regions of the country.
Figure 3.3: Estimated change in the adult sex ratio due to homicides rates from
1990 to 2009 (individuals from 15 to 44 years old).
The second eﬀect might be related to the expected quality of the future oﬀer -
xˆ. When the sex ratio decreases, each woman has less bargaining power and the
expected quality of the oﬀer decreases (men could choose better partners). What
is more, losing bargaining power reduces the capability of the woman to have
autonomy over her own fertility choices. Men, in times of conflict, aim to have
a child in order to build a memory or legacy, after their death. Then, @xˆ@V io < 0.
This result follows Abramitzky et al. (2010) and Chiappori et al. (2002).
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In addition, one can assume that violent conflict reduces the expectations of
future economic success. Soares (2005, 2013) and Lorentzen et al. (2008) argue
that armed conflict increases future uncertainty, and thereby reduces investment
in activities like education. One can also argue that the feeling of despair, as
opposed to hope, increases when violence increases around a household. What
is more, Rodríguez and Sánchez (2009) show that high school drop out rates
increase when violence increase in Colombia. Therefore, we could expect that
@ qi ci
@V ioi
< 0
Table 3.2 shows that violence also aﬀects parental expectations about the benefits
of education. Using data from the evaluation of the social welfare programme Red
Juntos7, the table shows that in municipalities where the mean and the standard
deviation of the homicide rate is higher, parents have lower expectations about
the income of their oﬀspring if he finishes high school or university education.
If parents expectations are lower, one can expect that youth living in violent
environments do not recognise an expected return from investing in education.
Therefore, the cost of being young parents reduces.
Table 3.2: Eﬀect of homicides on parental expectations about oﬀspring’s future
income, conditional on education
Violence1990 - 2009
Expected income conditional on working
High School University Diﬀerence
S.D. -0.047 -0.370*** -0.184
(0.078) (0.108) (0.141)
Mean -0.031 -0.246*** -0.122
(0.052) (0.072) (0.094)
N 1258 1055 1055
Base on the data from the welfare programme Juntos in 2011. The sample includes 77 municipalities.
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
Thus, the joint eﬀect of violence on the turning oﬀer would be:
@x˜
@V io
=
 
b
26664
 
@⇤x
@V io
+/ 
(v (xˆ) + xˆ   ) +
 
@xˆ
@V io
+
⇤x +
 
@ q c
@V io
37775 < 0 (3.6)
Consequently, @h@V io > 0.
Increased violence raises the incentives to anticipate pregnancy. However, there
7More information about the programme is available in
http://web.presidencia.gov.co/especial/juntos/index.html
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may be ways is such violence decreases the teenage pregnancy rate. Following
Shemyakina (2009), when the shock on male deaths is substantial, women may
postpone marriage and motherhood due to the decreased availability of men in
the area. Consequently, the final eﬀect can be ambiguous. Less women may get
oﬀers at t = 0, which means that the pregnancy rate falls. Yet, the women who do
get a signal are more likely to become pregnant, which means that the pregnancy
rate increases.
Following Acemoglu et al. (2004) male deaths could have a positive eﬀect on the
female labor market, thereby increasing the premium of postponing motherhood.
Their analysis is based on the situation of a massive confrontation such as the
World Word II. However, Singh and Shemyakina (2013) have shown the opposite
eﬀect during the Punjab insurgency.
A further consideration is that women perceive the shock of violence to be tem-
porary. The diﬀerence (⇤x xˆ   x˜) may increase so @(⇤x xˆ  x˜)@V io > 0 because a
future with no violence will allow even better conditions for infants. I cannot rule
out these last two options which imply a reduction in the probability of being a
young mother by an increase in the level of violence. However, I argue that the
eﬀects on the marriage and labor market overcome the eﬀect on (⇤x xˆ   x˜).
Unfortunately, the data available for this chapter does not allow me to disentangle
each channel. I do not have individual information about women’s expectations
in the labour and marriage markets. Nevertheless, my results support the notion
that the negative eﬀects on the labor and marriage market overcome the opposite
eﬀects. In summary, an increase in violence reduces the expected revenues of
young women in the labor and marriage market. Teenage pregnancy therefore
works as insurance when a loss in future utility is foreseen by young women.
3.3 Estimation strategy
Equation 3.5 shows how the probability of being a young mother depends on the
turning oﬀer x˜i. What is more, the last part of section 3.2 discusses how the level
of exposure to armed violence aﬀects the turning oﬀer and the pregnancy decision.
Hence, equation 3.5 is written as the probability of being a young mother as a
function of the violence she is expose to: Pimt (youngmother) = f (V iomt, Xi),
where V iomt is the violence at municipality m at period t.
In order to accurately estimate the probability of early motherhood, this chapter
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proposes to follow a survival analysis where the variable of interest will be the
hazard function hij = P (Ti = j | Ti   j) - which represents the probability of a
woman i become pregnant at period Ti = j given that she has not been pregnant
in any period before j. For this estimation I follow the strategy of discrete duration
estimations of Lancaster (1979) and Jenkins (2005)8. Therefore, in discrete time
hij = P (j   1 < T  j | T > j   1). Then, the hazard function can be written
as hij = h (j, Xi, V ioij) where Xi are the individual variables that aﬀect the
pregnancy hazard and V ioij is the level of violence an individual i suﬀered at age
j.
The first model to estimate would be a discrete time proportional hazard model
- PH - where hijmt represents the probability that woman i will become pregnant
at age j, given she was not pregnant before age j, and that she is living in
municipality m at period t. Once again, following Jenkins (2005), hijmt can be
written as a function of the unconditional hazard rate h0 (j) and a linear index
on Xi, V iomt and "ijmt.
hijmt = h0 (j) g ( Xi +  V iomt + "ijmt) (3.7)
From the latest equation according to the model developed in section 3.2, I ex-
pect that @h@V io = h0 (j)  g
0 > 0. With this model, and assuming that violence
shocks are predictable9, and V iot and g (V iomt) are bounded, it is possible to
identify  ˆ and the underline hazard function h0 (j) using standard regression
methods(Van den Berg (2001)). Accordingly, figure 3.6 (in section 3.5), will suf-
fice to show that conflict, measure by homicide intensity10, has a direct impact
on the probability of becoming a mother when young. Figure 3.6 shows how the
probability of becoming pregnant at age j is always greater for women who live
in violent towns.
However, the orthogonality condition may not be credible when the variable of
analysis is the violence that a household is expose to at certain period of time. In
the sense of duration models the endogeneity refers to unobservable variables that
aﬀect the level of exposure to armed violence, and the underlying hazard function
of first pregnancy (Bijwaard (2008)). In other words, there is an unobservable
8Given that the dependent variable will group all the observations in a yearly interval I use
a discrete duration model for my estimations. See further discussions in Jenkins (2005) chapter
3.
9Predictability is associated with weak exogeneity in time series models.
10Homicide intensity divide the municipality by a dummy such that homDm100 =
1 [homicide rate   100].
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force that may make some women more likely to be aﬀected by the local violence
of conflict and, at the same time, this aﬀects the probability that the woman
becomes pregnant at a certain age. Then, if V iomt 6? "ijmt we could expect that
V iomt 6? h0 (j), thus we cannot identify   using a PH model.
As I explained in the introduction to this chapter, the violent process in Colombia
does not have the characteristics of the strong exogenous shock found by previous
authors when they analysed the link between conflict, marriage and motherhood.
In Colombia, the diﬀerential eﬀect of the long lasting violent process could be cor-
related with diﬀerent institutions, the low presence of the state and risk aversion
profiles of the community. The latest list of variables can explain the diﬀerences
in the fertility profiles as well.
For this reason, this work proposes an instrumental variable strategy using the
variation in international cocaine prices and its interaction with the network of
roads that is used to traﬃcking cocaine from the cultivation regions to the inter-
national borders. Identification relies on the following statement: Drug dealers
react to changes in the relative profits that they could gain from diﬀerent interna-
tional markets. In my case, I only use the markets of Europe and United States.
What is more, I assume that the violence is the main force use by traﬃckers in
order to control the network. The usage of a fixed network varies in time as
a response of the relative profitability. Furthermore, the latest reaction implies
diﬀerent violent forces over certain regions at diﬀerent times.
The details of this strategy were described in section 2.3 of chapter 2. I define
DDmt to be the influence of the potential drug traﬃcking over municipality m at
year t. Moreover, I assume that DDmt ? "ijmt therefore DDmt ? h0 (j). In order
to estimate  , I write the proportional hazard model of equation 3.7 as a linear
indicator function11:
pregijmt = 1 [h0 (j) +  V ioijmt +Xi + T +M + "ijmt > 0] (3.8)
Thus, if F is the C.D.F of the error term  "ijmt I rewrite the latest equation as
pregijmt = F (h0 (j) +  V ioijmt +Xi + T +M). Moreover, as I discussed previ-
ously V iomt 6? "ijmt and V iomt 6? h0 (j). I therefore define V ioijmt as:
V ioijmt =  DDjt + h0 (j) +Xi + T +M + µijmt (3.9)
11T and M represent the year fixed eﬀects and municipality fixed eﬀects
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Endogeneity comes from the fact that (", µ) ⇠ ⇧ such that "ijmt = ⇡ (µijmt) +
!ijmt where ! has a C.D.F. defined by the function ⇤. Then, if I replace " in
equation 3.8 and I use the C.D.F ⇤. I rewrite the equation of first pregnancy as:
pregijmt = ⇤ (h0 (j) +  V ioijmt + ⇡ (µijmt) +Xi + t+m) (3.10)
Identifications relies on the distributional assumption on ⇧ which will determine
the distribution of !. Then, if I assume joint normality I can rewrite " as a linear
function of µ and ⇤ would be a normal function. Following I estimate a probit
over preg (like Blundell and Powell (2004)). Moreover, Lillard (1993) assumes
joint normality between the probability of dissolve marriage and pregnancy inside
marriage. This allows him to estimate the parameters of the function ⇧. For this
reason, I estimate my duration model using diﬀerent functional forms for ⇡ (µ)
and !.
Now that I defined my estimation strategy, the next section will describe the data
before showing the results of my model for the Colombian case.
3.4 Data
In order to estimate the model described in section 3.3, which uses as an instru-
ment the internal cocaine traﬃcking, following the model of chapter 2, I need
three diﬀerent data sets. Firstly, I use data about women pregnancy and sexual
behaviour. Secondly I need information of violence at municipality level. Finally,
I need information about the international prices of cocaine, coca fields and roads
to create the instrument.
In this chapter, I analyse the eﬀect of the homicides at municipality level over
the age of first pregnancy. Precisely, I use the homicide rate define as the number
of homicides per 100000 habitants12. The instrument DD follows the strategy I
developed in chapter 2 over a sample of municipalities that I specify later in this
section. Table 3.13 in the appendix of this chapter lists the diﬀerent data sources.
The individual data about women comes from the Colombian Demographic and
Health Survey (DHS) from 2000 to 201013. The data includes three cross sec-
12V iomt = hrmt = 100000
homicidesmt
populationmt
13Despite of I have data from the cohorts of 1986, 1990 and 1995, the survey has changed
over the years which allow
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tion cohorts (2000, 2005 and 2010) of women from 13 to 49 years old from 358
municipalities in Colombia. Table 3.3 summarises the main characteristics of the
sample of analysis. My sample adds up to 106405 women from 13 to 49 years
old in 361 municipalities. 23% of my sample are adolescents (from 13 to 19 years
old).
The first part of table 3.3 describes the main outcome variables in my analysis.
The average age of first intercourse, subject to having had intercourse, is 18 years
old. First pregnancy was around 19 years old, and first marriage around 20. Even
though these statistics are important for my analysis, a better approach to my
variables of interest appears in figure 3.4. Panel a shows the failure function while
panel b shows the hazard function of first intercourse, pregnancy and marriage
following Jenkins (2005). As we can see from panel a, at the age of 19 almost
80% of my sample have already had their first intercourse. While 40% and 35%
have been already pregnant or married for the first time. From panel b we can
see that the peak for the hazard of first intercourse is 18 years old. However, the
hazard for first pregnancy and marriage do not vary significantly from the age of
19 .
Figure 3.4: Discrete Failure and Hazard Functions for the age of first intercourse,
first pregnancy and first marriage
(a) Cumulative probability of failure -
F (j) (b) Unconditional hazard rate - h (j)
The survival is related with the event of being pregnant for the first time.
Cumulative probability of failure F (j) = 1  P (T > j)
Unconditional hazard rate h (j) = P (j   1 < T  j | T > j   1)
The estimation does not include individuals who migrate town at some point after turning 13 years old.
Furthermore, 78% of the households are in urban areas and on average each
household has 5.02 members. However, only 7% of the sample belong to indigen-
ous or black-Colombian communities. Around 70% of my sample was born before
1985. In addition, I use in my estimations a quartile classification of households
according to the a wealth index measure by the survey (see Rustein and Kierstern
(2004)). It is important to point out that characteristics such as ethnicity, wealth
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Table 3.3: Individual data descriptive statistics (DHS Sample)
Full sample Adolescent (13 to 19 y.o.)
Variable mean sd min max mean sd min max
Age 29.45 10.65 13 49 16.03 1.97 13 19
% 13 to 19 0.23 0.42 0 1
% 20 to 24 0.15 0.36 0 1
% 25 to 29 0.14 0.35 0 1
% 30 to 49 0.48 0.50 0 1
Sexual activity and marriage
Age at first intercourse 17.81 3.59 8 45 15.22 1.58 8 19
Age at first pregnancy? 19.95 4.46 13 45 15.76 1.49 13 19
Age at first birth 20.75 4.50 13 46 16.30 1.43 13 19
Age at first marriage 20.37 4.88 13 47 15.75 1.60 13 19
Migration (%)
Ever migrate 0.47 0.50 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1
migrate after 13 y.o. 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1
migrate after 15 y.o. 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1
migrate after 20 y.o. 0.22 0.42 0 1
migrate after 25 y.o. 0.14 0.34 0 1
Birth cohort
before 1985 0.70 0.46 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1
1985 to 1989 0.14 0.34 0 1 0.27 0.44 0 1
1990 to 1994 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1
after 1994 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1
Household
% in urban areas 0.78 0.41 0 1 0.75 0.43 0 1
# of household members 5.02 2.26 1 21 5.47 2.34 1 21
Ethnicity
white 0.50 0.50 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1
indigenous 0.02 0.14 0 1 0.02 0.14 0 1
afro-colombian 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.06 0.23 0 1
other minority 0.43 0.50 0 1 0.43 0.50 0 1
Household wealth index (%)
poorest 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1
poor 0.19 0.40 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1
middle 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.21 0.40 0 1
rich 0.22 0.41 0 1 0.21 0.40 0 1
richest 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1
Parents mortality (%)
mother is dead 0.14 0.34 0 1 0.02 0.16 0 1
father is dead 0.27 0.45 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1
both parents are dead 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.01 0.07 0 1
DHS Sample 2000 2005 2010 overall
Individuals† 11585 41244 53521 106405
(70) (231) (258) (361)
Source: DHS - Colombia 2000 to 2010. Author calculations. Mean and standard deviations estimations using probability weights.
†Municipalities in each sample in parentheses
?Includes women whose first pregnancy ended up with a miscarriage
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and household composition do not show significant diﬀerences between the full
sample and the sample of adolescents. Moreover, only 10% of my sample of ad-
olescents were born before 1985, which reduces the probability of left censoring.
Finally, for 9% of the teenagers in my sample, their father was deceased, while
only 2% have lost her mother.
Migration plays an important role in my analysis, and simultaneously represents a
major weakness of my analysis. I am unable to use observations from individuals
who migrate after the minimum age of analysis. If the women migrate after 13
years old, perhaps fleeting conflict, I cannot link her household with the violence
she was suﬀering at each age. Consequently, when analysing the pregnancy from
13 to 19, I lose 13% of my observations. I understand the bias this represent and
I take this into account while discussing my results.
Having described my outcome variables and the main characteristics of the in-
dividuals of my analysis, I now outline the main features of the municipality
homicide rate for the sample of 343 municipalities of the DHS sample. The main
statistics are shown on table 3.4. The average rate is 54.8 with a standard de-
viation of 58.1. The rates vary with age and gender: While the average male
homicide rate is about 100 homicides per 100000 habitants the female rate is no
larger than 10. Likewise, on average 92% of the casualties in a municipality were
men. The rate increases in age from a rate of smaller than 3 for younger than 14
and a rate of 96 for people from 14 to 44. After 44 years old the rate declines. .
The features I described in table 3.4 do not diﬀer from the ones I showed for all the
municipalities in chapter 2. This is important for my analysis, even though I have
already shown that municipalities get exogenous homicides shocks in response
to international prices of cocaine. I expect to get similar results using only the
sample of 341 municipalities on the DHS survey. What is more, figure 3.5 show the
evolution of the total homicide rate for the entire country and the municipalities
in the DHS sample. Both series only show minimal diﬀerences until 1997, apart
form that, the peak of violence is in 1992 with a decreasing tendency until 1997.
Then the violence increases again until 2002 when it radically drops until 2008.
Finally, table 3.14 (appendix 3.A), summarise the main statistics of the set of
variables at municipality level that I use as controls in my estimation. I compare
the municipalities in the DHS sample with all the municipalities in Colombia to
show that the sample does not represent only a subset of the national level.
As I have mentioned, the construction of my instrumental variable uses the in-
formation of international wholesale prices from UNODC and the network of
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Table 3.4: Municipality data descriptive statistics - homicide rates and municip-
ality control variables
mean sd min max
Total homicide rate 54.83 58.13 0 561
4 y.o. or less 2.02 10.85 0 407
5 to 14 y.o. 3.00 10.09 0 362
15 to 44 y.o. 96.13 107.04 0 1076
45 to 64 y.o. 59.13 78.99 0 1145
65 y.o. or older 26.41 59.27 0 1015
within municipality s.d. (Total) 31.79 26.61 0 157
Male homicide rate 99.94 106.11 0 957
4 y.o. or less 2.04 13.25 0 352
5 to 14 y.o. 4.05 16.72 0 685
15 to 44 y.o. 177.33 197.70 0 2022
45 to 64 y.o. 107.07 141.11 0 1471
65 y.o. or older 47.14 109.48 0 1887
within municipality s.d. (Total) 58.49 48.13 0 281
Female homicide rate 8.95 14.09 0 218
4 y.o. or less 1.99 16.60 0 820
5 to 14 y.o. 1.91 9.68 0 249
15 to 44 y.o. 14.24 25.34 0 353
45 to 64 y.o. 9.72 32.99 0 758
65 y.o. or older 5.82 33.37 0 712
within municipality s.d. (Total) 9.54 8.01 0 64
Male homicide proportion - male homicidestotal homicides
Total 0.92 0.13 0 1
4 y.o. or less 0.56 0.46 0 1
5 to 14 y.o. 0.68 0.41 0 1
15 to 44 y.o. 0.92 0.13 0 1
45 to 64 y.o. 0.92 0.18 0 1
65 y.o. or older 0.87 0.28 0 1
Notes: Author calculations, statistics over 343 municipalities in the DHS sample.
†Homicide data source: Vital statistics - DANE. Homicide rate is measure as homicides per 100000 habitants.
potential internal cocaine traﬃcking. These were developed in chapter 2.
3.5 Results
In this section I show and discuss the results of my estimations. I initially show the
eﬀect of homicides on the hazard of first pregnancy without using my instrumental
variable. Afterwards, I show the results from the first stage, which are not exactly
the same I found in the previous chapter due to sample structure. Following
this, I show the estimations of my hazard function using the control function
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Figure 3.5: Annual Homicide Rate from 1990 to 2009
Source: DANE - Vital Statistics (Deaths report). Homicide rate = homicides per 100000 habitants.
resulting from the first stage. I complete my analysis estimating the hazard
function for first marriage, first intercourse and second pregnancies. This supports
my my discussion of the mechanisms in which homicides aﬀect the first pregnancy
decision.
Before starting my estimations I need to transform my data to the shape of
a survival panel like Jenkins (2005). Therefore, I use the information of age,
municipality of residence and age at first pregnancy in the following way. The
first step is to determine using the year of birth, when each individual had her
13th birthday. At this age women become at risk of becoming pregnant. Once
I have the year when each individual is 13 years old, I create a dummy variable
which is equal to zero if that year she has not been pregnant. That dummy
turns to one at the age she reported to have become pregnant for the first time.
Subsequently, I leave her out of the sample for the following years. This dummy
is my variable pregijmt from equation 3.7 which will be 0 if women i that lives
in municipality m at year t has not be pregnant at age j. It is important to
point out that an individual is right censored if she has not been pregnant at the
time of the interview. In addition, left censoring occurs when a woman turned 13
before 1990 and was not pregnant the first year I observe her. I control for both
censoring cases in my estimations.
Once I have the panel on age, year and pregnancy, I create a key using the muni-
cipality of residence and year to merge the data at municipality level. Especially
the information of homicides V iomt. Now is important to return to the problem
I face with migration. If a woman has changed municipality of residence at some
point over the period of my analysis, I am not able to link the data of violence
she was facing in the origin municipality. For that reason, if we are analysing
pregnancy between age j and j¯ and she has migrated at some point between
these to points, she must be remove from my sample.
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Migration implies diﬀerent sources of bias that I am unable to control for. On
the one hand, migration is a strategy used by households to escape from viol-
ent conflict. Thus, women who do not migrate may have diﬀerent preferences
for motherhood given that moving or starting a family may be two substitute
strategies against conflict. In this case, my estimates will be upper bias. On
the other hand, pregnancy may have been the reason that they migrate. If so,
my estimate will be lower bias. This is without doubt a very interesting and
challenging problem for future research.
Another constraint I face with my panel is that for each individual I only have
information at one period in time. Therefore, I cannot control for changes in
some variables that may aﬀect the pregnancy decision. For that reason, in my
individual controls I only use variables that do not change in time and leave the
variables that vary in time in the error term. What is important for identification
is that those variables will no be correlated with my instrument.
My initial approach will be a proportional odds hazard model, following Jenkins
(2005). Additionally I will use a logarithm function for the underline hazard
function14. Without correcting for endogeneity, figure 3.6 shows that for any age
j < 25 the unconditional hazard of pregnancy is larger if a woman lives in a
municipality where the homicide rate is larger than 100. Furthermore, table 3.5
shows a significant and positive correlation between the homicide rate and the
hazard of becoming pregnant at a given age. The eﬀect seems to be significant
from 15 to 19 years old. There is no impact on older women (25 to 29 years old).
Figure 3.6: Discrete Survival Functions by Homicide Rate Category
(a) Probability of Failure - F (j) (b) Age hazard rate - h (j)
The survival is related with the event of being pregnant for the first time. F (j) = 1   P (T > j) and h (j) =
P (j   1 < T  j | T > j   1). The estimation does not include individuals who migrate town at some point after turning 13
years old.
14I estimate the model as well using polynomial and non parametric forms for h0 (j) and
the results did not change significantly. I decided to use the logarithmic form to simplify the
analysis and future calculations.
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Table 3.5: Discrete Logistic Duration Model: Age of first pregnancy on Homicides
per 100000 hb
Age Range
13-19 13-17 15-19 25-29
Zhom.rate 0.042** 0.040 0.048*** -0.003
(0.016) (0.028) (0.016) (0.068)
ln (age) 1.802*** 2.008*** 0.845*** -0.054**
(0.034) (0.060) (0.024) (0.023)
Constant -7.389*** -10.233*** -4.285*** -0.972
(1.220) (1.642) (1.241) (3.333)
R2 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.03
Ind. 46865 44890 42792 11309
Mpios 355 346 355 317
N 187569 149866 126337 31229
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipalities. * p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . All regression control for
ethnicity, household income, living in urban areas birth cohort, municipalities with coca fields, a dummy if the parents are dead,
Log of total population, department level GDP per capita and a dummy if the municipality was part of the CCT programme
“Familias en Acción”. Finally I include year and municipality fixed eﬀects.
However, I still cannot claim that this is a causal eﬀect because the orthogonality
condition - V ioijmt?"ijmt | j and h (j)?"ijmt may not hold for the reasons I
already discuss in section 3.3. Thus, I follow a two stage estimation as I described
in in equations 3.9 and 3.10.
Recalling my results from the previous chapter, I set the maximum length of the
traﬃc routes to 1000km. What is more, I use the extended model specification
without constraining when using the interactions between international prices
and the length function by cluster. Accordingly, table 3.6 shows the results for
the estimation of equation 3.9 over the sample of DHS municipalities and indi-
viduals of diﬀerent age groups. We must remember that, as result of the sample
composition, some results diﬀer marginally from the previous chapter when the
estimation included all Colombian municipalities - (see table 2.6). However, the
main relationships hold. What is more, the results are homogenous among age
groups.
Table 3.7 shows the second stage results over diﬀerent age groups. Initially I
assume that the relationship between the errors is linear. From my analysis, I
argue that an increase in the homicide rate (one standard deviation increase),
caused by changes in the international prices of cocaine, increases the probability
that an adolescent (13 to 19 years old), will become pregnant at a certain age
given that she was not pregnant before. Furthermore, the eﬀect is stronger in girls
between ages 15 to 19 than the eﬀect from 13 to 17. The latest result suggests
that homicides do not aﬀect very young teenagers, but teens who may be finishing
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Table 3.6: First Stage: Discrete Logistic Duration Model of Age of first pregnancy
on Homicides Rate instrumented using cocaine traﬃcking
P◆ Df
Age Range
13-19 13-17 15-19 25-29
P◆Df US Pacific 0.589*** 0.587*** 0.595*** 0.509**
(0.222) (0.222) (0.226) (0.218)
Atlantic 0.560** 0.583** 0.570** 0.414*
(0.235) (0.239) (0.242) (0.221)
Ven. South -0.282 -0.248 -0.327 -0.248
(0.357) (0.352) (0.361) (0.290)
Ven. North 0.305 0.256 0.302 0.590
(0.518) (0.496) (0.543) (0.470)
EU Pacific -0.615** -0.594** -0.636** -0.670***
(0.264) (0.269) (0.257) (0.221)
Atlantic -0.080 -0.060 -0.085 -0.117
(0.281) (0.286) (0.275) (0.266)
Ven. South 0.856* 0.873* 0.871* 0.572
(0.496) (0.511) (0.491) (0.405)
Ven. North -1.694*** -1.751*** -1.669*** -1.257***
(0.598) (0.604) (0.602) (0.463)
P◆Df⇡f US Pacific 4.903*** 4.755*** 4.982*** 5.207***
(1.586) (1.561) (1.583) (1.271)
Atlantic 0.121 0.038 0.089 -0.080
(1.012) (0.976) (1.004) (0.750)
Ven. South 0.802 0.844 0.843 0.402
(0.803) (0.785) (0.800) (0.808)
Ven. North -0.383 -0.391 -0.237 -0.235
(1.027) (0.994) (1.050) (1.073)
EU Pacific 6.915*** 6.748*** 7.017*** 6.349***
(1.143) (1.172) (1.118) (1.284)
Atlantic -0.617 -0.628 -0.600 0.099
(1.154) (1.149) (1.162) (0.506)
Ven. South 0.206 0.223 0.166 -0.097
(1.156) (1.147) (1.160) (0.975)
Ven. North 2.114 2.362* 2.094 0.126
(1.445) (1.426) (1.490) (1.484)
FTest 7.97 6.76 10.29 6.55
R2 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.78
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipalities. * p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . All regression control for
ethnicity, household income, living in urban areas birth cohort, municipalities with coca fields, a dummy if the parents are dead,
Log of total population, department level GDP per capita and a dummy if the municipality was part of the CCT programme
“Familias en Acción”. Finally I include year and municipality fixed eﬀects.
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high school and may be thinking about whether to continue education or begin
work. In contrast to the adolescents experience, the eﬀect of violence over the
hazard of first pregnancy disappears for older women (25 to 29 years old).
Table 3.7: Second Stage: Discrete Logistic Duration Model of Age of first preg-
nancy on Homicides Rate instrumented using cocaine traﬃcking
Age Range
13-19 13-17 15-19 25-29
Zhom.rate 0.088*** 0.016 0.104*** -0.003
(0.032) (0.046) (0.025) (0.083)
Control Function -0.061 0.032 -0.075** -0.003
(0.043) (0.058) (0.037) (0.103)
ln (age) 1.801*** 2.006*** 0.845*** -0.054**
(0.034) (0.060) (0.024) (0.023)
Constant -8.079*** -11.967*** -4.992*** -5.594
(1.648) (2.270) (1.716) (3.952)
1 s.d. on H (ageRange) (p.p)† 2.65** 0.36 2.58* -0.01
[1.32] [1.37] [1.40] [0.79]
Zscore stats
mean 56.35 56.41 56.36 58.25
s.d. 53.69 53.88 53.27 55.89
Fist Stage Fitness
FTEST 7.97 6.76 10.29 6.55
First StageR2 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.03
R2 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.03
Ind. 40766 39102 36756 9790
Mpios 357 357 357 351
N 187569 149866 126337 31229
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipalities. * p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . All regression control for
ethnicity, household income, living in urban areas birth cohort, municipalities with coca fields, a dummy if the parents are dead,
Log of total population, department level GDP per capita and a dummy if the municipality was part of the CCT programme
“Familias en Acción”. Finally I include year and municipality fixed eﬀects.
†Bootstrap standard errors clustered by individuals over 1000 repetitions.
Finally, it is important to mention that the linear control function is only negative
and significant for the 15 to 19 age group. This suggests that the endogeneity
of violent crime and women decisions may not be strong for younger adolescents,
however, it is important for older teenagers.
It is important to recall that my logistic functional form in a discrete duration
model identifies the proportional odd ratio. For a given age j and a vector of
observables X, I can define the odds as function of violence as ⇢ (V io| j, X) =
h(j, V io,X)
1 h(j, V io,X) . Then, for two values of violence (v1, v2) the odd ratio if h is a logistic
function would be ⇢(v1| j,X)⇢(v2| j,X) = e
 (v1 v2). Given that I standardised the homicide
rate in my analysis, for the age range from 15 to 19 years old, one standard
79
3. Drugs, Guns and Early Motherhood in Colombia 80
deviation increases the log of the odd ratio by 0.104.
So far, the interpretation of my coeﬃcients is not very clear. For this reason,
I use the coeﬃcients from the upper panel of table 3.7 to construct the hazard
function h (j, V io) from the logit form. Once I know the shape of h (j, V io) I
use Jenkins (2005) to construct the cumulative probability of becoming pregnant
in the age range of analysis. The cumulative failure function is F
 
j, j¯, V io
 
=
1  Qj¯x=j h (x, V io). Using the latest function I can analyse the impact of one
standard deviation on the probability of early motherhood. Then, following this
calculations I suggest that a woman living in a town where the homicide rate is one
standard deviation higher than the mean, increase her probability of becoming a
mother from 15 to 19 years old by 2.56 percentage points.
I continue my analysis by examining whether female and male homicide rates have
diﬀerent eﬀects on pregnancy, as I argue in section 3.2. Table 3.815 shows the
results of the duration model for individuals between 15 to 19 years old but using
the homicide rate by gender. As we can see, in both cases results are positive
and significant. However, the coeﬃcients for female homicides seem marginally
larger than the ones for male homicides. Despite the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients
is not statistically significant, the diﬀerent impact of female and male homicides
comes from the diﬀerence in the standard deviation of each rate. While in male
homicides one standard deviation comes from 104 homicides per 100000 males,
in females the same standard deviation comes from only 9 homicides.
Therefore, one can argue that the impact of one female homicide is larger than
a male homicide. This could suggest that women are more sensitive to their own
mortality than to changes in the couple market via changes in sex ratios. Nev-
ertheless, my results are not very conclusive because my instrumental approach
seems not to explain the behaviour of female homicides. The F test over the
excluded variables is only 4.9, therefore, the estimator may still be bias.
Finally, I analyse the relationship between first pregnancy, first intercourse, first
marriage and second pregnancy. I study if such pregnancy profiles are the result
of an out of the wedlock motherhood strategy or, conversely if pregnancy is part of
an strategy of creating family and getting household support. The results in table
3.9 suggest the latest hypothesis. Homicides have a positive and significant impact
on marriage but negative impact on the initiation of sexual life. Nevertheless, the
impact in percentage points over the cumulative probability function is larger in
the case of first pregnancy. This seems puzzling. However, one can argue that
15The results of the first stage regression are shown in table 3.15 at appendix 3.A
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Table 3.8: Duration Model on First pregnancy from 15 to 19 on Homicide Rate
by Gender of Deaths (1990 - 2009)
Gender of the homicides
Male Female
zHom 0.103*** 0.146***
(0.025) (0.037)
ControlF -0.075** -0.136***
(0.036) (0.045)
lnj 0.845*** 0.845***
(0.024) (0.024)
_cons -4.974*** -4.946***
(1.715) (1.262)
1 s.d. on H (15  19) (p.p) 2.56 3.74
[1.38] [2.02]
Zhom Stats
Mean 104.96 8.88
S.D. 98.53 10.97
Fist Stage Fitness
FTEST 12.06 4.98
First StageR2 0.73 0.48
R2 0.07 0.07
Ind. 36756 36756
Mpios 357 357
N 126337 126337
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipalities. * p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . All regression control for
ethnicity, household income, living in urban areas birth cohort, municipalities with coca fields, a dummy if the parents are dead,
Log of total population, department level GDP per capita and a dummy if the municipality was part of the CCT programme
“Familias en Acción”. Finally I include year and municipality fixed eﬀects.
sexual life may be starting later given a shortage of men as result of killings and
recruitment. Once a woman finds a suitable man, the violent context increases
her incentive to create a family via marriage and motherhood.
What is more, figure 3.7 shows that the probability of being a mother but not
being married, is never greater than 9% for women younger than 19. The prob-
ability of being married but not having a baby shows also a similar pattern. The
probability of being married but not a mother before 19 is always lower than 9%.
Finally, homicides have an negative impact on the hazard of having a second
pregnancy, conditional on already being a mother. This result reinforces the
hypothesis that early pregnancy and marriage strategy is an insurance strategy.
Once a teenage woman has already secured her lifetime consumption in the mar-
riage market (she already has a baby and a couple), the cost of having a second
baby is higher than the expected benefits. Thus, when violence increases, condi-
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Table 3.9: Discrete Logistic Duration Model of Age of first pregnancy, marriage,
intercourse and second pregnancy from 15 - 19 y.o. on homicide rate.
First Pregnancy First Marriage First Intercourse Second
Pregnancy
Zhom.rate 0.104*** 0.085*** -0.073*** -0.104***
(0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025)
1 s.d. on 2.58* 1.15 -2.31** -4.67*
H (15  19) (p.p)† [1.40] [1.12] [1.06] [2.57]
First Stage F 10.29 9.46 7.15 9.42
Ind 36726 36838 31865 10238
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipalities. * p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . All regression control for
ethnicity, household income, living in urban areas birth cohort, municipalities with coca fields, a dummy if the parents are dead,
Log of total population, department level GDP per capita and a dummy if the municipality was part of the CCT programme
“Familias en Acción”. Finally I include year and municipality fixed eﬀects.
Figure 3.7: Estimated probability of being a mother without being married or
being married without having children by age
The estimation does not include individuals who migrate town at some point after turning 13 years old.
tional on already having a family, the woman has less incentive to have a larger
family.
3.5.1 Robustness checks
3.5.1.1 The control function
The main concerns of my identification strategy come from the functional form of
my probability function h and the control function ⇡. For this reason, I give more
freedom to the later functions in order to show that my functional assumptions
do not constrain my results.
First, recalling from section 3.3, the control function approach comes from the
joint distributional assumptions of the error terms (", µ). Hence, my estimations
so far assume that the joint distribution is such that µ = ↵" + ! where ! has
82
3. Drugs, Guns and Early Motherhood in Colombia 83
a logistic form. This functional assumption is very strong. For this reason I
allow ⇡ (") to have a polynomial form in order to approach any nonlinear shape.
Therefore, I assume µ = ⇡ (") + ! for diﬀerent shapes of ⇡ but keep the logistic
distribution of !.
Table 3.10 shows coeﬃcients of main interest and the join significance test for
the control function polynomial. As we can see, the results F test increase to 10
when I use a polynomial of degree 4 and 5 showing that the shape of ⇡ may not
be linear. Nevertheless, the coeﬃcients on the homicide rate do not vary with
the polynomial form. This allows me to claim that the result using the linear
approach are strong even when I am do not pick up the appropriate shape of the
control function.
Table 3.10: Discrete Logistic Duration Model of Age of first pregnancy from 15 -
19 y.o. on Homicides Rate instrumented using cocaine traﬃcking
Using diﬀerent polynomial for the control function ⇡ (µ)
Control Function polynomial
1 2 3 4 5
Zhom.rate 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.101***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
ln (age) 0.845*** 0.845*** 0.845*** 0.845*** 0.845***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Constant -4.992*** -4.992*** -4.970*** -4.937*** -4.936***
(1.716) (1.716) (1.705) (1.704) (1.705)
1 s.d. on H (15  19) (p.p) 2.58 2.56 2.50 2.48 2.48
[1.40] [1.41] [1.40] [1.41] [1.41]
Control Function FTest 4.11 4.69 4.97 9.97 10.29
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipalities. * p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . All regression control for
ethnicity, household income, living in urban areas birth cohort, municipalities with coca fields, a dummy if the parents are dead,
Log of total population, department level GDP per capita and a dummy if the municipality was part of the CCT programme
“Familias en Acción”. Finally I include year and municipality fixed eﬀects.
Second, I keep the shape of ⇡ to the linear and change the assumptions on !.
This allows me to use diﬀerent functional forms that are better known in the
control function approach. For example, if I assume that (", µ) have a join
normal distribution and  µ = 1, then µ = ⇢"+ ! where ! ⇠ N (0, 1) - (Blundell
and Powell (2004); Heckman (1978, 1979)). Therefore, the later will identify  
using a linear probability model or a probit model to estimate h. As we can see
in table 3.11, specially the probit model seems very close to the results I found
in my logistic model. Indeed, the main features of my initial estimations remain
when I use the probit model.
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Table 3.11: Second Stage: Discrete Duration of Age of first pregnancy on Hom-
icides Rate instrumented using cocaine traﬃcking
Using diﬀerent functional forms for h (j, X, V io)
Functional form
Logit linear| Probit Clog-log
Zhom.rate 0.104*** 0.007*** 0.054*** 0.095***
(0.025) (0.002) (0.013) (0.024)
Control Function -0.075** -0.039** -0.069**
(0.037) (0.019) (0.035)
ln (age) 0.845*** 0.057*** 0.426*** 0.796***
(0.024) (0.002) (0.012) (0.023)
Constant -4.992*** -0.129 -2.600*** -4.368***
(1.716) (0.124) (0.624) (1.188)
R2 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipalities. * p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . All regression control for
ethnicity, household income, living in urban areas birth cohort, municipalities with coca fields, a dummy if the parents are dead,
Log of total population, department level GDP per capita and a dummy if the municipality was part of the CCT programme
“Familias en Acción”. Finally I include year and municipality fixed eﬀects. The number ob observations, municipalities and the
statistics from the first stage are the same for all functional forms. the information is in table 3.7 in the column from 15-19.
|This are the results of a standard linear IV model.
The problem of using the probit and linear specification is that I do not have
anymore properties of the proportional hazard model. Consequently, I use a
clog-log regression which maintains the proportional hazard qualities but implies
that ! has an extreme value distribution function. Once again the main features
of my model remain.
3.5.1.2 Potential drug traﬃcking and local income eﬀects
I want to find out if the drug traﬃcking is creating local income eﬀects. Evidence
of traﬃckers are increasing the income at municipality level would allow me to
argue that my estimators may be bias because the exclusion restriction will not
be valid anymore.
For this reason, I estimate the first stage of my analysis using municipality tax
revenues per capita as outcome variable. I aim to prove that changes in the
international prices of cocaine do not create changes in the legal municipality
income, which will be evident in higher taxes revenue. Table 3.12 shows that
when I run a regression at municipality level the F test of joint significance is only
2.5816. What is more, when I run the regression using the sample of individuals
the F test is not larger than 5.
16The resulting coeﬃcients could be seen in table 3.17 in the appendix.
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Table 3.12: Internal cocaine traﬃcking on municipality taxes per capita (2000 -
2009) - Joint significance F test and R2
All taxes Taxes without land value tax Taxes to fuel
FTEST 2.96 1.87 1.24
R2 0.81 0.78 0.95
mpts 1101 1101 1101
N 10902 10902 10538
The joint significance test F is on
P
◆
P
f
 
 ◆fP◆tDmf +  ◆fP◆t⇡mf
 
as defined in section 2.3 of chapter 2. The cocaine traﬃc
include only routes shorter than 1000km. All regression municipalities with a dummy per traﬃc cluster, a dummy for coca fields,
log of total population, department level GDP per capita and a dummy if the municipality was part of the CCT programme
“Familias en Acción”. Finally I include year and municipality fixed eﬀects. The individual level regression control as well for Log
of the age, if the observation is left censored, ethnicity, household income, living in urban areas birth cohort, a dummy if the
parents are dead
My last specification has two problems. Firstly, the information available comes
only from 2000 leaving the 1990’s out of the analysis. Secondly, taxes only rep-
resent changes in the legal economy. Thus, my analysis cannot distinguish if
drug traﬃc has an income eﬀect on the households. Nevertheless, taxes represent
increases in consumption, thus, if the illegal income was changing the household
consumption my analysis would have behave diﬀerently.
3.6 Conclusions and policy implications
Does armed violence aﬀect the incentives of young women regarding the timing
of first pregnancy? This work aimed to understand the behavioural rationale
underlying diﬀerential teen pregnancy profiles in conflict areas. An analysis of
the Colombian case implies several challenges for researchers trying to find out
causal eﬀects. In such a way, I take advantage of my findings in chapter 2, which
give us a source of exogenous variation in violence to identify the eﬀect of changes
in the homicide rate on the pregnancy decision of teenagers.
Thus, first of all, I set up a theoretical framework following closely Kearney and
Levine (2011). This is in order to describe the possible channels in which violence
could aﬀect the cost-benefit relation of postponing motherhood. I claimed that
increases in homicide rates change the marriage market composition and reduce
the expected value of a future partner. Furthermore, I claim that armed violence
reduces the subjective probability of achieving economic and personal success in
the future. This increases the incentives to invest in motherhood rather than
education when young.
Following my theoretical model, I propose a 2 stage duration model in order to
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estimate the eﬀect of increases in the homicide rate on the hazard of becoming
pregnant before 19 years old. In order to correct for endogeneity in my non-linear
model, I use a control function approach using diﬀerent assumption on the joint
distribution of the error terms of my structural equations. To estimate my model
I use data on women sexual behaviour from the DHS, the reports of homicides at
municipality level and the cocaine traﬃc model, which I explained in the previous
chapter.
Accordingly, for my sample I estimated the eﬀect of drug traﬃcking on the mu-
nicipality homicide rate. My results were very close to the the results in chapter
2 when I estimated the same model over all municipalities in Colombia. After-
wards, using a linear control function, I estimated a discrete logistics duration
model on the age of first pregnancy. I went one step further than the usual
duration literature and rebuilt the cumulative probability of pregnancy from the
hazard function I estimated.
I found that for the women between the ages of 15 to 19 the probability of becom-
ing pregnant increases by 2.58 percentage points when the homicide rate increases
in one standard deviation. Opposite to the later result, the eﬀect is negative and
not significant for women between the ages of 25 to 29. The probability of having
the first marriage between 15 to19 increases by 1.15 percentage points in contexts
of more homicides, while the probability of early first intercourse decreases. I ar-
gue that women choose to invest in a family, which could be a source of stability
and protection when the environment is violent and volatile. The reduction in the
probability of the first sexual event may be answering a shortage of suitable male.
When women secure the consumption in the marriage market, becoming preg-
nant a second time when young is more costly than beneficial when the homicide
rate increases. My results proved this last fact.
Afterwards, I use a set of diﬀerent functional form for either the probability
function and the control function in order to investigate if my results were caused
by strong identification assumptions. My main results remain. What is more, I
found some evidence of non linearity in my control function.
This chapter used a new source of exogenous variation and found strong evidence
of indirect cost to household welfare due to the violent conflict in Colombia. As a
result, I have an open window to analyse more possible consequences of violence
in Colombia and other countries with similar violent scenarios.
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Appendix 3.A Tables
Table 3.13: Main Data Sources
Group Data description Period Source
Women Fertility Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS)
1986 - 2010 Demographic and Health Surveys -
Profamilia
Violence Homicides at municipality level 1990 - 2009 CEDE- Human Rights Observatory
- Vice-presidency of Colombia
1990 - 2009 DANE - Vital statistics - Deaths
Reports
Cocaine traﬃc Colombian Road Network 2005 IGAC - SIG-OT
Wholesale cocaine price - Europe
and United States
1990 - 2010 UNODC - World Market Reports
Coca crops in Colombia 2001 - 2010 UNODC- SIMCI
Support data Population 1990 - 2009 DANE: Population estimates
DGP per capita (By department) 1990 - 2009 DANE
Municipality tax revenues 2000 - 2009 DANE - DNP
Municipalities in Familias en
Acción
2002 - 2009 Acción Social - Econometría S.A.
Table 3.14: Municipality data descriptive statistics - homicide rates and muni-
cipality control variables
Full Sample DHS Sample
(1014 municipalities) (343 municipalities)
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Population - Logarithm 9.54 1.06 5 16 10.30 1.16 8 16
GDP per capita? 4633.19 3812.02 311 28966 4467.53 3594.17 311 28966
With Coca fields (%)‡ 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.28 0.45 0 1
Familias en Acción (%)  0.19 0.39 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1
Notes: Author calculations
?GDP in thousands of pesos (COP) per year.
‡% of municipalities who have coca fields at some point from 2001 to 2009
 % of municipalities with the CCT programme Familias en Accíon. The programme star in 2002 and increase its presence until
2007.
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Table 3.15: First Stage: Discrete Logistic Duration Model of Age of first preg-
nancy on Homicides Rate by Gender instrumented using cocaine traﬃcking
P◆ Df
Gender of the homicides
Male Female
P◆Df US Pacific 0.619*** 0.250
(0.227) (0.182)
Atlantic 0.583** 0.343
(0.247) (0.219)
Ven. South -0.342 -0.225
(0.374) (0.298)
Ven. North 0.264 0.616
(0.561) (0.388)
EU Pacific -0.690*** -0.133
(0.264) (0.184)
Atlantic -0.090 -0.084
(0.284) (0.201)
Ven. South 0.876* 0.606
(0.494) (0.375)
Ven. North -1.599*** -1.609***
(0.588) (0.440)
P◆Df⇡f US Pacific 5.213*** 3.113***
(1.635) (1.150)
Atlantic 0.019 0.100
(1.016) (0.631)
Ven. South 0.909 0.009
(0.829) (0.555)
Ven. North -0.137 -1.175
(1.086) (0.942)
EU Pacific 7.021*** 4.843***
(1.055) (0.855)
Atlantic -0.598 -0.120
(1.139) (0.722)
Ven. South 0.031 0.728
(1.161) (0.922)
Ven. North 1.949 2.267
(1.434) (1.415)
FTest 12.06 4.98
R2 0.73 0.48
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipalities. * p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . All regression control for
ethnicity, household income, living in urban areas birth cohort, municipalities with coca fields, a dummy if the parents are dead,
Log of total population, department level GDP per capita and a dummy if the municipality was part of the CCT programme
“Familias en Acción”. Finally I include year and municipality fixed eﬀects.
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Table 3.16: First Stage: Discrete Logistic Duration Model of Age of first preg-
nancy on Homicides Rate by Gender instrumented using cocaine traﬃcking
P◆ Df First Pregnancy First Marriage First Intercourse Second pregnancy
P◆Df US Pacific 0.595*** 0.608*** 0.562** 0.538**
(0.226) (0.221) (0.223) (0.215)
Atlantic 0.570** 0.616** 0.497** 0.749***
(0.242) (0.247) (0.231) (0.261)
Ven. South -0.327 -0.274 -0.279 -0.252
(0.361) (0.347) (0.351) (0.459)
Ven. North 0.302 0.278 0.364 -0.031
(0.543) (0.523) (0.513) (0.727)
EU Pacific -0.636** -0.648** -0.603** -0.623**
(0.257) (0.254) (0.256) (0.257)
Atlantic -0.085 -0.069 -0.116 0.146
(0.275) (0.278) (0.268) (0.286)
Ven. South 0.871* 0.829* 0.850* 0.785
(0.491) (0.485) (0.499) (0.535)
Ven. North -1.669*** -1.635*** -1.630*** -1.800***
(0.602) (0.580) (0.620) (0.669)
P◆Df⇡f US Pacific 4.982*** 5.058*** 5.504*** 4.963***
(1.583) (1.583) (1.553) (1.508)
Atlantic 0.089 -0.033 0.441 0.082
(1.004) (0.957) (1.043) (1.159)
Ven. South 0.843 0.813 0.712 1.145
(0.800) (0.801) (0.832) (0.836)
Ven. North -0.237 -0.241 -0.302 0.055
(1.050) (1.025) (1.014) (1.407)
EU Pacific 7.017*** 7.000*** 6.977*** 6.353***
(1.118) (1.148) (1.128) (0.929)
Atlantic -0.600 -0.553 -0.815 -0.960
(1.162) (1.066) (1.276) (1.087)
Ven. South 0.166 0.173 0.126 0.523
(1.160) (1.165) (1.180) (1.087)
Ven. North 2.094 1.736 2.091 1.962
(1.490) (1.536) (1.537) (1.494)
FTest 10.29 9.46 7.15 9.42
R2 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by municipalities. * p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . All regression control for
ethnicity, household income, living in urban areas birth cohort, municipalities with coca fields, a dummy if the parents are dead,
Log of total population, department level GDP per capita and a dummy if the municipality was part of the CCT programme
“Familias en Acción”. Finally I include year and municipality fixed eﬀects.
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Table 3.17: Internal cocaine drug traﬃc on municipality taxes per capita (2000 -
2009)
Tax type
P◆ Df All taxes Taxes without land value tax Taxes to fuel
P◆Df US Pacific -0.035 -0.115** 0.005
(0.062) (0.057) (0.024)
Atlantic 0.071 0.017 0.029
(0.074) (0.070) (0.029)
Ven. South -0.209* -0.226 0.009
(0.114) (0.139) (0.011)
Ven. North 0.079 0.131 -0.014
(0.101) (0.124) (0.016)
EU Pacific 0.513 0.363 0.220
(0.341) (0.319) (0.193)
Atlantic -0.465 -0.433 0.091
(0.311) (0.304) (0.164)
Ven. South -0.624 -0.697 -0.167
(0.448) (0.523) (0.191)
Ven. North -0.372 0.136 -0.174
(0.425) (0.514) (0.140)
P◆Df⇡f US Pacific 0.014 0.071 -0.152
(0.130) (0.131) (0.195)
Atlantic -0.130 -0.054 -0.097
(0.186) (0.223) (0.119)
Ven. North 0.299 -0.407 0.369
(0.950) (1.171) (0.226)
EU Ven. South -0.135 -0.062 0.015
(0.257) (0.319) (0.048)
FTEST 2.96 1.87 1.24
R2 0.81 0.78 0.95
Mpios 1101 1101 1101
N 10902 10902 10538
The join significance test F is on
P
◆
P
f
 
 ◆fP◆tDmf +  ◆fP◆t⇡mf
 
as defined in section 2.3 of chapter 2. The cocaine traﬃc
include only routes shorter than 1000km. All regression municipalities with a dummy per traﬃc cluster, a dummy for coca fields,
log of total population, department level GDP per capita and a dummy if the municipality was part of the CCT programme
“Familias en Acción”. Finally I include year and municipality fixed eﬀects. The individual level regression control as well for Log
of the age, if the observation is left censored, ethnicity, household income, living in urban areas birth cohort, a dummy if the
parents are dead
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Chapter 4
Designing Optimal Reintegration
Contracts
4.1 Introduction
“In the civil conflicts of the post-cold-war era, a process of disarm-
ament, demobilisation and reintegration has repeatedly proved to be
vital to stabilising a post-conflict situation; to reducing the likelihood
of renewed violence, either because of relapse into war or outbreaks
of banditry; and to facilitating a society’s transition from conflict to
normalcy and development.” Annan (2000)
This quote, from the United Nations Security Council Report in 2000, summarises
the importance of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programmes
(DDR1), in the international political aﬀaires. In countries with active armed
conflict and post-conflict environments where these types of programmes domin-
ate policy agendas. DDR programmes have been running over the last 20 years
in more than 20 countries in Africa, Asia, East Europe and Latin America. How-
ever, given the heterogeneity and individual dynamics of conflict, there is no
clear rule or fixed guidelines as to how these programmes should be design and
implemented2.
1See the UN definitions from Annan (2000)
2These are some countries with DDR in the world. Africa: Angola, Burundi, Central African
Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivory, Eritrea, Guinea
Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Su-
dan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Asia: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Philippines, Indonesia. Europe:
Latvia, Hungary, Poland. Serbia. Latin America: Colombia, Honduras, Haiti, Honduras and
Nicaragua.
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The DDR programmes can be an outcome of peace negotiation, or in some other
countries the programmes begin while the conflict is still active. In some cases,
the DDR is imposed by the victors as a concession to the defeated parties as
part of bargaining in post-conflict negotiations. According to OSAA and DRC
(2007), in Africa the DDR programmes have developed a a consequence of varied
negotiation processes. In Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, the DDR was
the results of a negotiated peace following external pressure. In Angola, Rwanda,
Uganda and Ethiopia, the DDR programmes were established by the winning
party over the defeated one. In Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and
Côte d’Ivore, the DDR programme resulted from a peace agreement, due to
external intervention in a mutually destructive stalemate.
It is important to point out that the literature about DDR is rich and strongly
developed in political sciences and sociology. Unfortunately, there is a lack of
economic analysis. In political science Clark (1995) describes the main challenges
and issues that the UN faces when setting up and running DDR interventions.
Some of the issues for DDR pointed out by Clark were the legal constraints
of bringing back soldiers that had been the perpetrators of violence in some
communities. Moreover, DDR implementation could face disruptions as well due
to the political fragility during and after confrontations, the uneven negotiations
for diﬀerences in the bargaining power of the parts, the reactions of external
agents and operational issues. Clark’s main concerns have been aﬃrmed in other
cases as well (see Caramés et al. (2007); Annan (2000, 2006)).
Additionally, there is an international movement to create guidelines, common
strategies and monitoring systems to improve the implementation of the DDR
programmes. In 2002, the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Pro-
gramme (MDRP), was launched to combine eﬀorts on the reintegration of more
than 400 thousand combatants from the conflicts in the Great Lakes region in
Africa. Further, in 2006 the UN published the Integrated DDR Standards (ID-
DRS), where the UN compiled and standardised guidelines towards a common
approach to this kind of programmes - see UN (2006).
Despite of the policy and social implications of DDR processes, the economics
literature concerning this topic are extremely poor. However, to begin my analysis
of DDR programmes I review the literature of job search and crime. I use the
papers of Burnett et al. (2004) and Engelhardt et al. (2008) as an starting point for
my study. These papers propose a model where crime is a parallel opportunity for
agents who are competing in the job market. Thus, the probability distribution
of the job searching and crime success and the diﬀerent payments for each action
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will shape the optimal choice of job searching and crime.
This work does not analyse the political implications of DDR and focuses in the
economic features of the reintegration process, particularly, I set up a model to
describe the characteristics of an optimal reintegration contract. This work aims
to answer the following questions: What is the shape and duration of the optimal
benefits? What is the optimal trade-oﬀ between security and benefits? What is
the role of households and firms when designing the contract?
This chapter places the analysis of reintegration in Colombia, where the armed
conflict has been on going for over than 50 years. External to international
debates about DDR, diﬀerent type of post-conflict processes and approaches to
the DDR have been implemented in Colombia. The latest DDR experience in
Colombia began with the peace negotiations with the Paramilitary Armies in
2002 and the final agreement in 2006. Since 2006, Colombian’s DDR programme
has received more than 55000 excombatants and has invested around USD 35
million.
The programme includes the opportunity for any combatant to join individually,
without being part of peace negotiations with the government. This feature
is one of the keys of the model I develop in my theoretical framework. The
characteristics of the target individuals make DDR programmes very challenging
to carry out. According to oﬃcial reports around 65% of the excombatants have
only primary school education or less, opposite to 7 years of war experience (see
DNP (2008); Arjona and Kalyvas (2011)).
Thus, this chapter proposes a theoretical framework in order to describe the
main features of what an optimal reintegration contract should be. The model
focuses on the interaction between an individual combatant and a government
that wants to bring this individual back into society. This part of the model
emphasises the importance of the trade oﬀ between treats and benefits and the
influence of informational rents over the shape of the optimal menu of benefits.
Following this, I introduce heterogeneity and include a tax payer in order to solve
the selection problem. In simple terms, the tax payer would decide the Principal’s
budget constraint in order to reduce the impact of conflict.
As I said before, my models are very close to the literature of job searching and
crime. However, the main diﬀerences to the existing literature are the following.
Firstly, the active role of a Principal who is designing the contract. Secondly, the
importance of the selection process and the social cost of the outsiders.
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Therefore, I build from the fact that DDR programmes are usually managed by a
central government and make my models close to the literature of optimal welfare
programmes. Accordingly, I use a similar structure to the social welfare models
of Shavell and Weiss (1979) and others.
This chapter has the following order. After this introduction section 4.2 describes
the history and main features of the DDR programme in Colombia. I also describe
the main characteristics of the participants in the programme. Thereafter, section
4.3 introduces my first model and analyses the moral hazard problem that arises
when a Principal needs to oﬀer a benefit menu to a excombatant. Afterwards,
I introduce heterogeneity in the combatants and the role of the tax payer to
find out which is the shape of the optimal selection of individuals to be treated
in a DDR programme. Each of the last two chapters shows some calculations to
understand the role of diﬀerent parameters on the optimal shape of the contracts.
Finally, section 4.5 concludes3.
4.2 DDR in Colombia
The current DDR programme in Colombia - from now on Colombian Reinteg-
ration Programme - CRP, has been running since 2006. However, this is not
the only DDR experience in the country. Since the creation of the first guerrilla
movement in 19644 the armed conflict in the country has had diﬀerent stages that
have included diﬀerent groups involve and several peace negotiations.
The first peace talks between guerrillas and the central government were in the
Belisario Betancourt5 period in 1983 - see Turriago-Piñeros and Bustamante-
Mora (2003). The first agreement with the FARC guerrillas include the law 35 of
1982, which set the guidelines for amnesty and the reintegration of combatants
to society. Unfortunately, after years of negotiation the violent reaction of right-
wing paramilitary armies did not allow the parties to reach a successful peace
agreement.
However, some other guerrilla groups such as the M-19, EPL, ADO and some
small fronts of ELN signed peace agreements with the government from 1985 to
1990. They were the first participants in a reintegration process in Colombia.
3This draft includes the section 1 and the introduction of section 2. I am now working in
the data analysis.
4Despite there were some guerrilla actions from 1958 the origin of FARC comes for the
creation of the South Guerrilla Block in 1964 - see Oﬀstein (2003).
5Belisario Betancourt was the president of Colombia from 1982 to 1986.
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Since those initial agreements, the reintegration programmes included a scheme
of economic benefits in order to guarantee the return of the former combatants
to the legal life.
It is important to point out that since the initial programme in the 1990’s the
government has allowed the mechanism to be used on an individual basis. In spite
of the proposal to have an open reintegration programme future negotiations,
with no formal peace talks the the reintegration programme swapped its role.
Therefore, the programme involve individual combatant who surrendered and
left their armies without peace talks or local negotiations.
According to Pinto et al. (2002) by 2001, 4715 excombatants were part of the
RP in Colombia. The majority of these individuals came into the programme
individually without a peace process. This initial group of participants showed
characteristics common to future individuals in the programme. According to the
authors, 82% of these excombatants entered into the illegal armed groups (IAG),
when they were 17 years old or younger; 84% have incomplete primary school.
As I said before, these features impose great challenges for a welfare system.
The core of this chapter aims to analyse the DDR programme running in Colom-
bia since 2003 in the government of Alvaro Uribe6. The programme is part of
the set of reforms that followed the peace process between the government and
the paramilitary armies - AUC. There is strong debate around the political im-
plications of the transitional justice regimes and the agreements made with the
AUC. Even though this is not part of my analysis, it is important to point out
the significant political and institutional cost implied in a process of this kind.
Some authors like Betancourt and Theidon (2006) and Cardenas-Sarria (2005)
analyse the main components of the institutional debate that followed the peace
agreement.
One of the main outcomes of this process was National Policy for the Social and
Economics Reintegration of Illegal Armed Groups (PRSE). As part of the PRSE,
the government created the Oﬃce of the High Commissioner of Peace, from now
on ACR. ACR is the government oﬃce who manage the reintegration policies.
The process to enter into reintegration is the following. Firstly, after disarmament
each excombatant has to get a certification of demobilisation. This certification
indicates that he/she need to fulfil requirements to prove that he/she was indeed
part of an IAG and that he/she has no direct responsibility in crimes against
6Alvaro Uribe was the president of Colombia over 2 consecutive periods, 2002 to 2006 and
2006 to 2010.
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humanity7.Afterwards, ACR specially provides psychological support, education
and work training, financial and entrepreneurship advice or provide help for the
individuals to find a job. What is more, after the demobilisation the ACR gives
around USD 200 monthly8 to each excombatants.
The CRP was the result of the peace talks with the AUC. Therefore, the pro-
gramme started with the participants of the collective demobilisation process of
the paramilitary armies that began on November 2004 and went until December
2006. On this period 31671 soldiers demobilised from the IAG.
Since 2006, the government, once again, left the window open for any soldier of
an IAG to enter into the programme. This was in order to oﬀer incentives to
combatants to demobilise and leave war without further peace negotiations. As
we can see in figure 4.1, collective demobilisations of the AUC were carried out
from 2004 to 2006. The individual demobilisation, participants of guerrilla groups,
shows a stable trend increasing year by year until 2009. Around 2700 individuals
were demobilised each year. By 2013, 53600 individuals have left their armies,
22 thousand chose to demobilise individually. According to administrative data
from ACR, 57.8% of the demobilised individuals (31168 excombatants) have been
part of the DDR programme.
Figure 4.1: Aggregate demobilised combatants by type of demobilisation (2003 -
2009)
Source: ACR
Table 4.1 describes the participants in the DDR programme in Colombia since
2002. As we can see, 88% of the population are male, mainly from 26 to 50
years old. By 2008, almost 70% came from the paramilitary armies of AUC.
That proportion reduces from 2008 to 2013 given the increase in the individual
demobilisation, described above. Moreover, by 2013 almost all the participants in
7The crimes against humanity are defined by Rome Statute of the International Court.
8According to ACR the payment comes from COP 160000 to COP 480000 monthly subject
to participation in the ACR activities. Between 2008 to 2009 the ACR payed about USD 147.
millions between 28932 individuals. (Source ACR (2010))
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the programme received psychological support while about 10 thousand receive
some education, and less that 4 thousand some work training. However, by 2008,
more than 1600 participants were killed either by the governmental forces or other
illegal groups. More than 1700 were recaptured by the police forces due to having
returned to illegal activities.
Table 4.1: Main characteristics of the participants in the DDR programme in
Colombia
% of male 88.2
Age (% by age group) 8 to 25 8.9
26 to 50 82.4
Older than 50 4
Group of Origin⇤ (%) FARC 24.1
ELN 5.1
AUC 69.9
Other 1
Death or recapture⇤ Death 1676
Recapture 1726
ACR Services† Total 32128
Psychological support 32123
Education 10260
Work training 3715
Source: ACR - Several reports and DNP (2008)
⇤ Only include individuals from August 2002 to April 2008
† Only include the period from june 2012 to may 2013
Table 4.2 gives a more detailed view of the demobilised group from a sample of
1458 individuals9. In that group, the average age is 29 years, although, on average
individuals enter into the IAG at the age of 21 and had been part of the IAG for
6 years. What is more, these individuals have their first experience with a gun
when they were only 17 years old, and exited the education system at the age
of 13. The later shows the spacial combination of very low skills to work in the
legal labour market as opposed to extensive training in illegal work. Despite the
kind of human capital and the ’bad’ skills they have for employment, more than
80% have worked after they demobilise. Nevertheless, only 53% were working at
the time of the interview.
The aim of the following section is to define a reintegration contract that takes
into account the social cost of conflict and the human capital characteristics of
the individuals who will be participating in the DDR programme.
9The information was collected by Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP).
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics by type of demobilisation
Type of Demobilisation
Total
Individual Collective
Sample proportion 0.508 0.492 1
FARC - % 61.3 2.06 32.9
ELN - % 15.0 0.8 8
AUC - % 19.4 96.4 56.8
Male proportion 0.779 0.908 0.842
(0.415) (0.289) (0.364)
Age 28.46 31.42 29.91
(8.136) (7.504) (7.968)
Age at IAG entrance 18.60 23.84 21.17
(6.815) (7.255) (7.504)
Time in the IAG 6.628 4.862 5.752
(5.564) (4.484) (5.132)
Age of first gun use 15.76 19.20 17.43
(5.248) (5.485) (5.631)
Age when left school 12.22 14.08 13.14
(4.879) (4.721) (4.889)
Previous disarmament eﬀort 0.609 0.527 0.569
(0.488) (0.500) (0.495)
Disagree with Demobilisation . 0.111 0.111
(.) (0.314) (0.314)
Has worked since demobilised 0.822 0.886 0.853
(0.383) (0.318) (0.354)
Currently employed 0.494 0.578 0.535
(0.500) (0.494) (0.499)
Observations 754 731 1485
Source: Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) - Author estimations. standard deviations in parentheses.
4.3 A DDR contract with moral hazard
The initial approach to the optimal reintegration contract follows the main idea
of unemployment insurance literature. This model follows the structure of Shav-
ell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Pavoni and Violante
(2007). This literature sets a framework where a Principal (Government), oﬀers
a set of benefits to an Agent (unemployed individual) who has to exert some
eﬀort in order to get a job. In this case, the Principal will oﬀer a contract to an
specific kind of Agent, who is a combatant part of an IAG in order to support
him abandoning war, to being looking for a legal job. My model fits with the
environment of individual demobilisation and not collective demobilisation where
IAG set the reintegration condition when the negotiate with the governments.
This section initially deals with homogeneous agents. The next section introduces
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heterogeneity in the preferences for crime and human capital, which will be the
link between the moral hazard and the selection problem. The initial results diﬀer
from the known literature of UI because there is an open window to an increasing
benefits scheme in order to avoid the return to crime. What is more, the model
shows the optimal trade oﬀ between benefits and punishments.
4.3.1 Initial set up - Timing, Players and Strategies
Assume a two periods game t = {0, 1} with a discount rate  . At t = 0 both
Principal and Agent choose actions and at t = 1, nature plays and final outcomes
are realised10. The first player is the Principal. He is a risk neutral government
with a set of policy variables   = {b0, b1, s, c}, where bt is the benefit oﬀered to
the Agent at period t. On the other hand, s is the expenditure in security per
Agent11 and c is the level of consumption oﬀered at prison.
The Agent is a soldier member of an IAG. He gets utility from consumption and
has a cost from the actions that he chooses. His utility function any stage is
increasing and concave in consumption and separable in consumption and cost of
eﬀort. The utility function is U (x, a), where x is his consumption at stage t.
The set of actions of each agent isA = {out, in  search, in  no search, in  crime}.
Initially he decides if he goes in or stays out the Reintegration Programme (RP).
If he stays out he will get his outside option which is his live time utility as an Il-
legal Soldier (IS ). I denote this as J (s, c) with @J(·)@s < 0,
@J(·)
@c > 0 and
@2J(·)
@s2 < 0,
@2J(·)
@c2 < 0. If he chooses to go into the RP he will choose between three diﬀer-
ent actions; he can search for a job, no search for a job or commit crime. To
simplify, the agent inside the programme will choose an action a 2 ARP ⇢ A
where ARP = {search, no search, crime}. Furthermore, the cost function for
this actions is v (a 2 ARP ) = {↵, 0, ✓} . Assumption 1 summarises the main char-
acteristics of the agents’ utility function in the programme and assumption 2 the
characteristics of his utility outside the programme.
Assumption 1. The utility function of the Agent is separable in consumption
and cost of actions. Moreover, the Agent is risk averse U (x, a) = u (x)  
v (a) where u0 (x) > 0, u00 (x) < 0 and cost function v (a) = {↵, 0, ✓} for a =
{search, no search, crime} with ↵, ✓ > 0.
10Another view can be an static game when players play at the beginning of the period and
nature plays at the end.
11Like investment in more police or military technology.
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Assumption 2. The life time utility of the agent outside the programme is a
decreasing and weakly convex function on security and increasing and weakly con-
cave function in consumption in jail. Then, J (s, c) with @J(·)@s < 0,
@J(·)
@c > 0 and
@2J(·)
@s2  0, @
2J(·)
@c2  0.
4.3.2 Crime Market
The crime market follows the basic idea of Becker (1968) and many others. The
Agent who commits a crime has two possible outcomes, with probability p (s, a)
he fails and goes to jail where he gets consumption c. On the other hand, with
probability (1  p (s, a)) the Agent succeeds in the crime and gets a prize Z.
Assumption 3 summarises the main characteristics of the probability of failure in
criminal activities.
Assumption 3. The probability of failure in criminal activities does not ex-
ist if the action chosen by the Agent is diﬀerent to a = crime. Then,8s !
p (s, a = crime) 2 (0, 1) and p (s, a 6= crime) /2 R.
Furthermore, p (s, a = crime) is an non-decreasing weakly concave function in
security expenditure: @p(s, a)@s   0 , @
2p(s, a)
@s2  0.
4.3.3 Labour Market
The initial set up summarise a simple search environment when for a given action
- a - and a level of legal human capital – h, the Agent finds a job with probability
⇡a and gets a wage W
Assumption 4. The probability of finding a legal job is increasing in eﬀort and
is equal to zero if the Agent chooses action crime. Then: 0 = ⇡crime < ⇡no search <
⇡search < 1.
4.3.4 The Optimisation Problem - Finding the Optimal Be-
nefit Scheme
To simplify the problem lets assume no budget constraints, no informational
asymmetries, homogeneous agents and fixed security expenditure and consump-
tion in jail. Now, given assumptions 1 to 4, the Principal wants the Agent to
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choose the action a = search. Then, the Principal minimises the benefits ex-
penditure for any {s, c} solving the following problem12:
min
{b0, b1}
b0 +  
 
1  ⇡search  b1
s.t.
u (b0)  ↵ +  
⇥
⇡searchu (W ) +
 
1  ⇡search u (b1)⇤   J {IR1,  }
(4.1)
Constraint IR1 (associated with Lagrange multiplier  ), is the individual ration-
ality constraint and ensures that agents prefer go into the RP over staying outside
in illegality. No diﬀerent from previous results in literature, with no information
asymmetries 1u0(b0) =
1
u0(b1) =  , therefore   > 0 and b0 = b1 = b
⇤, then the indi-
vidual rationality constraint bind with equality and the principal oﬀers constant
benefits to the agent.
Before extending the analysis and introduce asymmetries in information it is
important to remark some features of this simplified model. Firstly, the lack of
budget constraints and homogeneity reduce the Principal problem to a standard
framework of one principal and one agent. This can be driven by an ability of
the Principal to observe any source of heterogeneity and the ability of oﬀering
a diﬀerent contract to each agent. Secondly, fixing security expenditure and
jail consumption can represent independence between the RP and the National
Security budget.
To introduce the information problem, lets assume the following: The principal
can observe Agent’s first level actions but not second level actions. This means
that the Principal observes if the Agent stays out or comes into the RP. How-
ever, once the Agent is inside the programme the Principal is unable to ob-
serve the Agent’s actions. Although, the Principal still observes final outcomes
(employed, unemployed, in jail). Then, to the problem described in equation 4.1
I add up the following constraints.13:
12Notation note: for any constrained optimisation problem I use the following notation
max/min
xi
Objective function
s.t.
constraint {Constraint Name, Lagrange Multiplier}
13p = p (s, a = crime) 8s
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 
 
⇡search   ⇡no search  (u (W )  u (b1))   ↵ {IC1,  1}
 
264
 
⇡searchu (W ) +
 
1  ⇡search u (b1) 
  (pu (c) + (1  p) u (Z + b1))
375   (↵  ✓) {IC2,  2} (4.2)
Equation 4.2 describes the incentive compatibility constraints, IC1 and IC2. The
new constraints assure that the Agent will optimally choose action search over
actions no search and crime. In IC1 the expected diﬀerence between the payoﬀs
of get a job or not must be larger than cost of searching. Conversely, in IC2 the
diﬀerence in the expected benefits of looking for a job and committing a crime
have to be larger or equal to the diﬀerence in the cost of actions search and crime.
Is important to remark on the role of b1 in IC1 and IC2. In IC1 b1 needs to be
as small as possible in order to give incentives to search for jobs penalising the
action no search. On the other hand, in IC2 the eﬀect of b1 is ambiguous because
an increase on b1 increases the expected utility in both scenarios, legal and illegal
markets. Then, if the probability of failing in legal markets is larger than the
probability of succeeding in crime14 the Principal might want to increase b1 in
order to encourage legal markets over illegal markets. The latest would be clearer
after solving the first order conditions (FOC) of this problem.
u0 (b0) =
1
 
(4.3)
1 =

    1(⇡search ⇡no search)1 ⇡search
 
u0 (b1)
+ 2
h
u0 (b1)  1 p1 ⇡searchu0 (Z + b1)
i (4.4)
From equation 4.3, the FOC on b0, we can see that   > 0 then the IR1 binds. The
latest result means that for the government it is optimal to oﬀer the minimum
benefit such that the agent will leave the IAG. Moreover, equation 4.4 rules the
behaviour of b1. The first part of the equation is the standard UI result in the
literature, then if  2 = 0 then u0 (b0) < u0 (b1) and the benefits are decreasing
in time in order to incentivise job searching, same result of Shavell and Weiss
14 1  ⇡search  > (1  p)
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(1979).
However, if  2 > 0 the benefits can be increasing, constant or decreasing over
time depending on the relative advantages that the principal finds in the legal or
illegal markets. It may not be clear in the equation 4.4 but the intuition behind
is really straight forward. When the labour market prizes the eﬀort of looking for
a job and there is a large diﬀerence
 
⇡search   ⇡no search  there is no need for the
Principal to punish the action no search. In this case the Principal has a window
to oﬀer an increasing benefit scheme in order to prevent future crime. Yet, if the
labour market conditions do not help and the diﬀerence
 
⇡search   ⇡no search  is
very small, the Principal might need to use a decreasing benefits scheme.
Figure 4.2 is a simple example when is easier to understand how the benefit
scheme could vary depending on the diﬀerent market conditions. Firstly, the
graphs show the expected utility of a representative Agent (ceteris paribus), as
a function of b1 fixing b0 = 4 (vertical line) under 3 diﬀerent labour market
conditions. The dotted line represents the utility if the Agent searches for a
job, the dashed line is the utility if the Agent does not search and the filled line
represents the utility when the action crime is chosen15. An incentive compatible
contract is such that the utility of search is larger than the utility of choice any
of the other 2 actions. In this framework, a contract will be incentive compatible
if, for a given b1, the dotted line is above the dashed and the filled lines. This
is represented by the shadowed area over the horizontal axes16. Finally define
4⇡ =  ⇡search   ⇡no search .
Under good labour market conditions (Figure 4.2a), the range of IC contracts is
very large and leaves space for having b1 > b0. In this case, the Principal might
choose increasing benefits because the labour market is giving natural incentives
for searching and he can reduce crime with larger benefits. On the other hand,
with poor labour market condition (figure 4.2b), the government needs to punish
the no eﬀort action, and constrained to use decreasing payments, the shadow area
is always below b1 = 4. What is more dangerous for the principal is the scenario
with very poor labour market conditions (Figure 4.2c). Under this conditions
there is no IC contract, the labour market is poor and the crime market oﬀers
always a better option. With this last environment the Principal would need to
choose a no IC option when he would need to choose if he prefers the agents not
looking for jobs or the agents coming back to crime.
15The line is almost horizontal because I assume a large prize on crime, then @U(Z+b1)@b1 ⇡ 0
16I am assuming that the IR holds.
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Figure 4.2: The Role of b1 under diﬀerent labour market conditions
(a) Good Labour Market Conditions - 4⇡ = 0.55
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(b) Poor Labour Market Conditions - 4⇡ = 0.3
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(c) Very Poor Labour Market Conditions - 4⇡ = 0.2
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Assume u(x) = x
1  
1   . The parameters for this calculations: w = 9, p = 87%, c = 2, z = 15,   = 95%,   = 0.6, ↵ = 0.6, ✓ =
0.8
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This last fact encourage the first extension of the basic model. I introduce a new
control variable, now the Principal will be able to aﬀect directly the criminal
market in order to guaranty IC contracts. The first variable to be introduced in
the model is the expenditure in security.
4.3.5 The role of security expenditure
Figure 4.2c showed that the assumptions and instruments in the model are not
enough for the existence of equilibrium. If the criminal activities give the Agent
a high utility, the benefits scheme will not be IC, and possibly will not be IR
either. To solve this problem, I introduce a new control variable: The Principal
will be able to choose s, which is the expenditure in security per Agent. As I said
before the security expenditure increases the probability of catching a criminal
and reduce the expected utility for any criminal activity (either war or committing
crime in the RP). Now, the Principal’s problem is:
min
b0, b1, s
b0 + s+  
 
1  ⇡search  b1
s.t.
u (b0)  ↵ +  
⇥
⇡searchu (W ) +
 
1  ⇡search u (b1)⇤   J (s) {IR1,  }
 
 
⇡search   ⇡no search  (u (W )  u (b1))   ↵ {IC1,  1}
 
264
 
⇡searchu (W ) +
 
1  ⇡search u (b1) 
  (p (s) u (c) + (1  p (s)) u (Z + b1))
375   (↵  ✓) {IC2,  2}
(4.5)
Taking FOC on s and combining it with the FOC in b0 I can find the following
expression17:
17With symmetric information b0 = b1 = b⇤ and   > 0. Given that IR1 binds the solution of
the problem is the vector a vector [b⇤, s⇤] which solves the following system:24 u (b⇤)  ↵+   ⇥⇡search (h)u (W ) +  1  ⇡search (h) u (b⇤)⇤  J (s) = 0
u0 (b⇤) + @J(s)@s = 0
35
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u0 (b0) =  
✓
J 0 (s) +
 2
 
p0 (s) (u (c)  u (Z + b1))
◆
(4.6)
The last equation summarises the Principal’s optimal choice of security expendit-
ure. In the left hand side I have the marginal utility of b0 and in the right hand
side I have the weighted marginal disutility to the Agent by an increase of security
expenditure. Then, the optimal choice of benefits and punishments will make the
Agent indiﬀerent between receiving an extra unit of benefit or suﬀering and extra
unit of security. The solution of this problem should be a vector [b⇤0, b⇤1, s⇤,  1,  2]
which solves the system of equations 4.3, 4.4, 4.6 and the Kuhn Tucker conditions
{ 1IC1 = 0,  2IC2 = 0}.
In order to gain a better understanding of the solution of the maximisation prob-
lem I simplify the system. I assume Z is a very large number, then by concavity
of u (x) when Z ! 1 then u0 (Z + b1) ! 0. Equation 4.4 would look like
u0 (b0) =
⇣
 +  2    1
⇣
⇡search ⇡no search
1 ⇡search
⌘⌘
. As shown before, the relation between
s and b0 are linked by the IR constraint and the optimality condition described
by equation 4.6. In other words, you look for the minimum expenditure pos-
sible but keeping the agent indiﬀerent between the principal tools. Therefore, the
FOC on b1 will look as Shavell and Weiss (1979), and the role of benefits is to
incentivise searching over no search. Meanwhile, security should reduce the left
hand side and equalise the equation 4.6 which guarantees searching over staying
in the illegal group and returning to criminal activities.
Nevertheless, the main forces once again are the capability of absorbing of the
labour markets and the capability of deterrence of security investment. Therefore,
I illustrate how diﬀerent values of the security technology and the search premium
4⇡ =  ⇡search   ⇡no search . In my calculations, I assume that the agents utility
functions has CARA form like u (c) = c1  1   , the probability of being caught in
crime has an exponential form like p (s) = 1  exp (  s); and the outside utility
for the agent will be J (s) =  1exp (  s). In this set up,   will capture changes
in the security technology.
The first analysis on figure 4.3a shows the eﬀect of security technology. When  
is very small and the security technology is not eﬃcient, the principal needs to
increase the benefits over the time in order to disincentives the agent to come back
to criminal activities. Once the technology improves there are two eﬀects: Firstly,
the Principal need less expenditure to reduce the criminal utilities of the Agent.
Secondly, the eﬃciency of the threat gives to the Principal the opportunity to
use the benefits in order to incentives search over no search. Therefore, for large
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Figure 4.3: Simulating the optimal solutions for s, b0, b1
(a) Changes in Security Technology parameter -  
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Assume u(x) = x
1  
1   , p (s) = 1  exp (  s) and J (s) =  1exp (  s).
The base line set of parameters is: w = 3, c = 0, Z = 5,   = 85%,   = 0.65, ↵ = 0.35, ✓ = 0.25, ⇡ (a = search) =
40%, ⇡ (a = no search) = 0%   = 0.15,  1 = 7
† Change ⇡search keeping ⇡no search = 0
values of   the Principal finds optimal having b1   b0.
The second exercise on figure 4.3b fixes the probability of finding a job if a=no
search and describes the equilibrium over diﬀerent levels of ⇡search. It means that
the premium of search  ⇡ =
 
⇡search   ⇡no search  varies between the diﬀerent
scenarios. Initially, when the labour market does not reward the search eﬀort, the
Principal uses security investment as the main instrument to keep the constraints.
Thereafter, while  ⇡, increases the pressure on security expenditure falls and the
principal uses increasing benefits to maintain the Agent outside crime. Once the
labour market conditions and the expenditure can be low enough to keep the
Agent out of crime, the Principal now can come back to the decreasing benefit
scheme to incentives job searching.
The latest result support the importance of ACR in Colombia and many other
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DDR programmes all around the world for education and job training. As soon
as the excombatant leaves war his human capital composition is such that the
search premium is close to zero. This means that, security and deterrence are the
key tool for keeping the Agent out of crime. When the former IS improves his
skills for the legal labour market the benefit structure plays an important role.
Up to this point, my simple principal-agent framework shows some very important
features of what an optimal reintegration contract should be. However, there are
two assumptions that narrow my analysis in terms of public policy. Firstly, this
is 1 to 1 game between one principal and one agent. So next section will firstly
introduce heterogeneity in the agents and will set up the selection problem for
the Principal. The second assumption is the lack of budget constraints. I will
add up a tax payer into my model to set up an endogenous budget constraint to
the problem.
4.4 The selection problem for a DDR programme
The model in the previous section is equivalent to a game between one Principal
and one Agent. This kind of relationship was the result of some of the model as-
sumptions. With no budget constraint and the ability of the Principal of observe
and design a contract for any kind of agent the latest model suggests a benefit
and threats scheme depending on the market parameters as I showed before. But,
what would happen if the Principal cannot observe every single Agent character-
istic? What would happen if the Principal has a budget constraint? Who should
the Principal target to come into the RP?
To answer these questions, in this section I propose a selection model. Initially,
introducing unobservable heterogeneity in agents outside utility the Principal will
not be able to design individual contracts. However, I fixed the Principal’s budget
constraint and solve the problem under symmetric and asymmetric information.
I propose an endogenous budget constraint where the community decides how
much to spend in order to reduce the eﬀect of war.
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4.4.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity with Exogenous Budget
Constraint
Assume that each IS is diﬀerent from others by an unobservable preference for
war. I denote the individual preference for war with the Greek letter iota where
◆ 2 R. I define F (◆) to be the cumulative probability distribution function of
◆. Assumption 5 describes the shape F (◆). Furthermore, each IS gets utility
from the damage he/she produces. I define z (◆) to be the damage that each
IS produces for a given. What is more, each IS produces a damage z (◆) and
assumption 6 complements assumption 2 and summarises the new characteristics
of J (s, ◆).
Assumption 5. The preferences for war ◆ have a cumulative probability function
F (◆) and a density probability functionf (◆) . F (◆) continuous and twice diﬀeren-
tiable on ◆ 2 R .
Assumption 6. (Complementing assumption 2). The IS lifetime utility in
war is a monotone non-decreasing and concave function on war preferences - ◆ -
for all s. Then, @J(s, ◆)@◆ >0,
@2J(s, ◆)
@◆2 <0 and
@J(si, ◆)
@◆ =
@J(sj , ◆)
@◆ for all si, sj 2 R+
Finally, the Principal has a fixed budget to the programme denote by ⌦ > 0.
This initial set up has the following implications: firstly, the Principal cannot
diﬀerentiate between two agents, and thus cannot adjust the contract to every
single agent. Given the monotonicity of u and J , the principal would optimally
oﬀer an unique contract   (◆ˆ). Secondly, assuming that the expenditure in security
is not per agent but aﬀects any agent in the same way. S represents the total
security expenditure. Thus, the budget constraint obliges the Principal to select
the number of agents to be included in the programme and under what conditions.
Given that J (s, ◆) is monotone and non-decreasing in ◆, any contract   (◆ˆ) which
is individual rational for the agent ◆ˆ would be individual rational for any ◆ 
◆ˆ. Therefore, with symmetric information in actions the Principal will choose
  (◆ˆ) = [b⇤, S⇤, ◆ˆ⇤] such that:
109
4. Designing Optimal Reintegration Contracts 110
S⇤ + b⇤F (◆ˆ⇤) = ⌦ {BC}
264 u (b
⇤)  ↵+
 
⇥
⇡searchu (W ) +
 
1  ⇡search u (b⇤)⇤
375 = J (S⇤, ◆ˆ⇤) {IR (◆⇤)}
@u(b⇤)
@b⇤ =  @J(S
⇤, ◆ˆ⇤)
@S⇤ {OC (◆⇤)}
(4.7)
The system of optimal conditions is simple. Given that the Principal does not
gain any utility from saving and there is no credit market, the budget constraint
binds. Thus, the Principal will look for the agent ◆ˆ⇤ such that he will expend
all his budget to take the agent ◆ˆ⇤ and all the other combatants below this agent
into the RP. All these agents choose optimally to leave the IAG. The last two
equations of the system described in 4.7 define the shape of the optimal contract
◆ˆ⇤ when the actions are observable. It is important to note that the monotonicity
of J (S, ◆) assures that what is optimal for ◆ˆ⇤ will be accepted by anyone below
◆ˆ⇤.
Moreover, in the previous section I showed that with unobservable actions in the
RP the optimal shape of the benefits, depend on the security technology and the
search premium. Therefore, by assumption 6 and given that 4⇡ is not a function
of ◆, the latest result also applies in this case. Thus, if   (◆ˆ⇤) is the optimal
contract for agent ◆ˆ⇤, then, IR, IC1 and IC2 will hold for all the agents who will
enter into the programme.
The main features of my last result depend on the size of the budget - ⌦. For
this reason, in the next section I allow tax payers to decide the budget dedicated
to reducing the cost of conflict.
4.4.2 Endogenous Budget Constraint
This far, the Principal aims to minimise the number of illegal soldiers in war
assuming implicitly that utility is gained from this behaviour. Simply, the result
of the conflict is a transmission of utility from the law-abiding community to the
IAG. The Principal acts as a Social Planner who maximise the welfare of the entire
community (legal and illegal). In order to achieve the goal the Principal allocates
illegal soldiers in or out the programme. The Principal, moreover, collects taxes
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from law-abiding community to fund the security policy.
Initially I split the total population between Civil Community – CC – and the Il-
legal Armed Group – IAG. Where ⇤ represents the proportion of CC and (1  ⇤)
the proportion of the population who are part of an IAG18. The CC produces Y
and gets utility from final consumption. Declare V (x) a increasing and concave
aggregate utility function of CC 19. The output of conflict is a loss in consumption
for CC and the size of the loss depends on the size of the illegal army. I call Z (x)
the consumption loss produced by an IAG of size x.
What is more, each IS gains utility from consumption, as I defined previously the
IS utility function is U (x). Inside a RP each IS consumes benefits b and outside
the programme consumes the value of the damage made - z (i).
The Principal now wants to maximise the utility of the entire community (CC and
IAG) allocating IS in and out the RP. This initial approach fixes the expenditure
in security and assumes no informational asymmetries and no credit markets. The
Principal collects taxes from CC in order to fund his policy. Thus, assumption 7
defines CC’s utility function and assumption 8, the damage function. Thereafter,
I define the Principal’s problems.
Assumption 7. The utility function of the Civil Community V (x) is increasing
and weakly concave in consumption x. Then, V 0 (x) > 0, V 00 (x)  0.
Assumption 8. The individual damage function z (◆) is monotone, increasing
and weakly convex in ◆. z0 (◆) > 0, z00 (◆)   0.
Thus, the Principal now solves:
18This model does not try to explain the initial decision of entrance in an IAG so the pro-
portion ⇤ is predetermine.
19This work diﬀerentiate between the utility function of civilians and illegal soldiers. The
main hypothesis is diﬀerences in risk aversion levels..
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max
b, ⌧, ◆ˆ
8><>:
⇤V (Y   ⌧   Z (1  F (◆ˆ)))
+ (1  ⇤) U (b)F (◆ˆ) + ´1◆ˆ U (z (◆)) f (◆) d◆ 
9>=>;
s.t.
Z (1  F (◆ˆ)) = ´1◆ˆ z (◆) f (◆) d◆! Transmission Rule
U (b) = U (z (◆ˆ))! Decision rule
b (1  ⇤)F (◆ˆ)  ⇤⌧ ! Budget constraint
(4.8)
Before explaining the problem’s equations, it is useful to make a some notes about
my model. Firstly, it is important to clarify the role of ◆ˆ. ◆ˆ defines the proportion
of the IAG who enter in the RP and have left war. Given assumptions 1, 5 and 8
any IS such that ◆  ◆ˆ would optimally choose to leave war and get the benefits
of the RP. However, any ◆ > ◆⇤ remains outside the programme and gains utility
from armed conflict U (z (◆)). The utility functions {V, U} look like static utility
functions but they can be understood as life time utilities for diﬀerent agents in
diﬀerent states20.
I can describe each equation in order to understand better the maximisation prob-
lem. The objective function is the weighted sum of the utilities of CC and IAG.
The final consumption of civilians is [Y   ⌧   Z (1  F (◆ˆ))] when Z (1  F (◆ˆ)) is
the loss generated by an IAG of final size 1 F (◆ˆ), because the proportion F (◆ˆ)
is in the RP and will not produce any further damage anymore. Additionally,
the IAG utility has 2 components: the proportion F (◆ˆ) enter in the RP and each
one gets utility U (b) . Each IS that stays in war produces a damage z (◆) and
gains utility from this. Thus, the aggregated utility of those who stay at war is´1
◆ˆ U (z (◆)) f (◆) d◆.
The Principal in this case faces three constraints. The first is the Transmission
Rule. As I explain above each IS produces a damage z (◆). If all the ISs whose
◆ > ◆ˆ stay at war, the aggregated loss would be
´1
◆ˆ z (◆) f (◆) d◆. Therefore, this
damage is equal to the total loss in utility for the CC. The second constraint
is the Principal’s decision rule. Using the monotonicity of U (x) and z (◆), the
Principal chooses an agent ◆ˆ such that he is indiﬀerent between being in or out
20For example U (b) in the same framework of the moral hazard model can be written as
U (b) = u (b)  v (a) +   [⇡au (W ) + (1  ⇡a)u (b)]
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the RP, once again, any agent with ◆  ◆ˆ will come to the programme and all the
agents with ◆ > ◆ˆ would stay at war. The last constraint is a standard budget
constraint without credit markets. In order to simplify my problem I plugged
the Transmission Rule into the objective function and solve for b in the Decision
Rule, thus, I can rewrite the problem in equation 4.8 as:
max
⌧, ◆ˆ
8><>:
⇤V
 
Y   ⌧   ´1◆ˆ z (◆) f (◆) d◆
 
+(1  ⇤) U (z (◆ˆ))F (◆ˆ) + ´1◆ˆ U (z (◆)) f (◆) d◆ 
9>=>;
s.t.
z (◆ˆ) (1  ⇤)F (◆ˆ)  ⇤⌧ {BC, µ}
(4.9)
Taking FOC with respect to ◆ˆ and ⌧ and simplifying:
V
0
◆ˆ⇤, ⌧⇤ = µ (4.10)
✓
2⇤  1
1  ⇤
◆
z (◆ˆ⇤)
z0 (◆ˆ⇤)
  (◆ˆ⇤) = 1  U
0
◆ˆ⇤
V
0
◆ˆ⇤, ⌧⇤
(4.11)
Where V 0◆ˆ⇤, ⌧⇤ is the marginal utility of consumption21 at the optimal {◆ˆ⇤, ⌧ ⇤} and
  (◆ˆ⇤) = f(◆ˆ
⇤)
F (◆ˆ⇤) is the Inverse Mills Ratio at ◆ˆ
⇤. Therefore, from the FOC I take the
following conclusions. First, using assumption 7 in equation 4.10 I can show that
µ > 0 and the budget constraint binds. Therefore, the optimal level of taxation
is represents only a consumption transfer from the CC to the ISs in the RP.
What is more, given assumptions 5 and 8, for any ⇤ > 12 the marginal utility of
the ISs inside the programme is lower than the marginal utility of the CC 22. If
the CC and the IS have the same level of risk aversion, giving that both functions
are concave equation 4.11 implies that the consumption for an IS is larger that
the consumption of CC. Thus, b⇤ = z (◆ˆ⇤) > W◆ˆ⇤, ⌧⇤ . In order to reduce the
externality that the IAG creates the CC will pay a premium. This implies a
larger consumption level for the IS who decides to leave the war. Furthermore, it
is pretty likely that someone who is involved in a risky activity like war can have
21CC consumption is W◆ˆ, ⌧ = Y   ⌧  
´1
◆ˆ z (◆) f (◆) d◆
22In Colombia the largest guerrilla FARC will no represent more than 0.1% of the total
population.
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a lower level of risk aversion than someone who has never been in war. Thus, V
is more concave than U , and my last result becomes stronger.
According to the size of the IAG (1  ⇤), their capacity to induce damage zz0 and
the skill distribution characteristics   (◆), the CC will pay a premium to achieve
higher utility reducing the level of conflict.
Following the framework I use in the last part of section 4.3, I introduce security
investment into my analysis. In order to do so, I redefine the damage function z as
z (◆, S) where zS (◆, S) < 0. The latter means that security reduces the damage
made by each IS. What is more, the price of S will be qs. Then, assumption 9
complements assumption 8.
Assumption 9. (Complementing assumption 8). The damage function is
now a strictly decreasing function on the total security expenditure. z (◆, S) where
zS (◆, S) < 0.
Furthermore, the new budget constraint will be qsS+ z (◆ˆ, S) (1  ⇤)F (◆ˆ) = ⇤⌧ .
Therefore, if I plugged the budget constraint into the objective function, the new
Principal’s problem will be:
max
◆ˆ, S
8>><>>:
⇤V
⇣
Y   qsS+z(◆ˆ, S)(1 ⇤)F (◆ˆ)⇤  
´1
◆ˆ z (◆, S) f (◆) d◆
⌘
+(1  ⇤) U (z (◆ˆ, S))F (◆ˆ) + ´1◆ˆ U (z (◆, S)) f (◆) d◆ 
9>>=>>; (4.12)
Then, in the FOC with respect to ◆ˆ I find the same expression as 4.11. Moreover,
the FOC with respect to S will be:
(1  ⇤)rSU
V 0◆ˆ⇤, S⇤
  ⇤rSz + (1  2⇤) z (◆ˆ⇤, S⇤) f (◆ˆ⇤) @◆ˆ
@S
= qs (4.13)
rSU =
´1
◆ˆ⇤ U
0 (z (◆, S⇤)) zS (◆, S⇤) f (◆) d◆ is the cumulative disutility of the IAG
when the principal increases security. Furthermore,rSz =
´1
◆ˆ⇤ zS (◆, S
⇤) f (◆) d◆ is
the reduction in damage to the CC for an increase in security. Then, the choice of
security expenditure equals the price of the investment with its marginal benefit.
The marginal benefit of security is described in the left hand side of equation
4.13. The first part (1 ⇤)rSUV 0
◆ˆ⇤, S⇤
weighs the disutility of the IAG with the increase in
consumption by the CC. What is more, by assumption 9,  ⇤rSz is the marginal
benefit for damage reduction. The last part of the left hand side of equation 4.13
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includes the trade-oﬀ between benefits and security that I have developed in this
chapter. This measures the eﬃciency of security as a tool to incentivise more IS
to join the RP at the level of benefits that the IS who join the RP will obtain. It
is important to remember that each IS in RP will receive the same the benefits
of the optimal pivotal agent - z (◆ˆ⇤, S⇤).
To conclude this section, the Principal will use the available tools, benefits and
security depending on the price of the latest and the relative eﬃciency in order to
get IS out of war. What is more, the CC it self will pay the taxes ⌧ that reduce
optimally the damage they are suﬀering for war.
4.5 Conclusions and policy implications
The analysis of the social and political issues that governments, international
agencies and communities face are well analysed in the political and sociological
studies. However, there is no economical and technical analysis of these type of
programmes. This chapter aims to contribute to this gap in existing literature.
Specifically this chapter models two informational issues: (1) The moral hazard
driven by the hidden action of participants in these type of programmes, espe-
cially, the incentives that some IS s have to commit crimes while receiving some
benefits from a RP. (2) The selection problem that governments could face given
the limited resources available and the informational asymmetries.
To explain the implications of hidden actions I proposed a simple static moral
hazard problem with one Principal (government) and one Agent (IS ). In this
model the Principal uses benefits and security expenditure to bring the IS to a
RP and make the Agent optimally search for a job over no search, or commit
crime. In the model the search premium
 
⇡search   ⇡no search  and the technology
in security define the trade oﬀ between benefits and punishments. When the
security technology is good, the principal can set decreasing benefits to provide
incentives for the job search. However, if the labour market prizes the search and
the security in technology returns turn to zero the Principal could use a scheme
of increasing benefits to make the Agent choose searching for a job over returning
to criminal activities.
Afterwards, I introduce unobserved heterogeneity in the agent’s preferences for
war to analyse the selection issues. Initially with exogenous budget constraint
the Principal oﬀers an unique contract that is individually rational and incentive
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compatible for a pivotal Agent with ◆ˆ⇤ preference for war. Given the monotonicity
assumption, this contract will bring any agent with ◆  ◆ˆ inside the RP and leave
all the others active in war.
Finally, I model the role of the tax payer or CC who is the one to decide how much
to pay in order to reduce the eﬀect of conflict. In this case the Principal collects
taxes from CC and chooses a pivotal agent ◆ˆ such that this agent is indiﬀerent
between war and RP. The benefit of bringing this agent back to legality (given
the reduction in damage) is equal to the cost that the CC will have to pay to
make his contract individually rational. What is more, once again, the relative
productivity of benefits and security over the pivotal agent will define the shape
of the optimal contract.
This chapter aimed to provide simple policy guidelines for running and carrying
out or forthcoming DDR programmes. I intend to explain the main implications
of the informational problems that a policy maker may find while implementing
a reintegration contract. What is more, this chapter opens a window for further
research. Using administrative or survey data about individuals in the RPs, would
be possible to estimate, for instance, the trade-oﬀ between security and labour
market benefits, or the evolution of an individual in the RP as a function of his
levels of human capital.
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Conclusions
Colombia is world famous for the production of coﬀee, Gabriel Garcia Márquez
(Literature Nobel Prize in 1982), and more recently, the pop singer Shakira. How-
ever, sadly the country is also famous for the production of cocaine and the violent
armed conflict that has lasted over 50 years. This thesis uses microeconometric
methods to analyse the economic implications of the Colombian armed conflict.
Chapter 2 develops a strategy to deal with the endogeneity problem that arises
when researches want to estimate the impact of violence on households in the
environment of a long-lasting conflict. I use the geographical comparative ad-
vantage that some regions have in cocaine traﬃcking, through access to certain
international markets in order to estimate exogenous violent variations when the
price of cocaine international markets increases. I constructed a network that
links the coca cropping municipalities with Colombian’s frontiers using the sys-
tem of primary and secondary roads. The network represents the set of possible
traﬃcking choices available to drug dealers aiming to sell cocaine to international
traﬃckers at the Colombian border.
After finding more than eleven thousand traﬃcking routes I restricted my analysis
to the routes of less than a 1000 km. I divided the network further according to
the border where each route finishes. I claimed that the routes that finish on the
Pacific coast serve traﬃc to the US while the ones ending on the southern border
with Venezuela supply to EU market. As follows, my reduced form estimation
shows that when the cocaine price in the Unites States increases, the homicide
rates increase in the municipalities that are part of the traﬃc that finish on the
Pacific, Atlantic and the northern border with Venezuela. On the other hand,
homicides rise in the municipalities involved in traﬃcking through the southern
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Venezuelan border when the price of cocaine increases in Europe. The latest
conclusions hold when I weighted each municipality according to the average
length of the traﬃc routes.
I extended my analysis to the behaviour of illegal armies. According to my
estimations the ELN follows closely the rents of cocaine. The probability of its
presence increases in the Pacific, Atlantic and Venezuela North traﬃc clusters
when the cocaine price in US increase. Moreover, ELN presence increases in the
Venezuela South cluster when the returns in the European market rises. FARC
guerrillas, however, follow the rents on the cluster of the southern border with
Venezuela, while not getting directly involved in the traﬃc of the Pacific to the
US.
Chapter 3 uses the exogenous variation on homicides found in the previous chapter
to study if armed violence aﬀects the incentives of young women regarding the
timing of first pregnancy. The chapter presents a theoretical framework following
closely Kearney and Levine (2011) to describe the possible channels that such
violence could aﬀect the cost-benefit relation of postponing motherhood. I claim
that increases in homicide rates change the marriage market composition and
reduce the expected value of a future partner. Furthermore, I claim that violence
reduce as well the subjective probability of achieving economic and personal suc-
cess in the future. This increases the incentives of investing in motherhood when
young.
Afterwards, I propose a two-stage discrete duration model in order to estimate
the eﬀect of increases in the homicide rates on the hazard of becoming pregnant
before 19 years old. I found that women from 15 to 19 years of age, increase their
probability of becoming pregnant by 2.58 percentage points when the homicide
rate increases in one standard deviation. Conversely, the eﬀect is negative and not
significant for women from 25 to 29 years old. Besides, the probability of having
the first marriage between 15 and 19 years of age, increases by 1.15 percentage
points. However, the probability of earlier first intercourse or second pregnancies
when teen decrease. My results suggest that when violence increases women
invest in family, which could be a source of stability and protection.
Finally, my last chapter focuses in the DDR programmes. I developed a Principal-
Agent model to describe the features of an optimal reintegration contract. I pay
particular attention to the cost of informational asymmetries.
In the model the Principal uses optimal benefits and security expenditure depend-
ing on the labour market and security capabilities. When the security technology
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is very good, the Principal can set decreasing benefits in order to give incentives
to job searching. Moreover, if the labour market prizes the job search and the se-
curity in technology is poor the Principal can use a scheme of increasing benefits
to make the Agent to choose the job search over returning to criminal activities.
I conclude chapter 4 by introducing unobserved heterogeneity in the agent’s pref-
erences for war and a tax payer, or CC, who decides how much to pay to reduce
the eﬀect of conflict. In this case the Principal collects taxes from the CC and
chooses a pivotal agent ◆ˆ such that the this agent is indiﬀerent between war and
RP. Moreover, the benefit of bringing this agent back to legality (given the re-
duction in damage) is equal to the cost that the CC will have to pay to make his
contract individually rational. Once again the relative productivity of benefits
and security over the pivotal agent define the shape of the optimal contract.
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